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Abstract
This dissertation contains three essays in industrial organization economics that use theoret-
ical, reduced-form, and structural analysis to examine various effects of policies and market
mechanisms in concentrated industries.
The first chapter, “Equilibrium and Welfare Implications of Store Brands in Vertical
Markets,” theoretically and empirically studies the effect of store brands on equilibrium
outcomes and welfare. I demonstrate the ambiguous theoretical predictions of how store
brands can impact equilibrium outcomes using a simplified model, motivating two related
empirical exercises that assess the implications of store brands in the U.S. yogurt market.
First, I use an event study framework to show that after a store brand introduction, the prices
of retailer national brand products increase. Second, I develop a structural model of upstream
vertical interaction between manufacturers and retailers, incorporating the strategic use of
store brands and downstream consumer demand for differentiated products. I fit the model
to observed pricing and quantity data to recover underlying consumer preference parameters
and marginal costs. I then conduct counterfactual simulations that remove retailer store
brands to show that the benefit of store brands to retailers and consumers, and the harm to
manufacturers, is magnified under increased upstream market concentration.
The second chapter, “Patent Licensing and Bias in Estimation and Prediction” (with
Xuan Teng), evaluates the consequences of analyzing market outcomes when patent licensing
relationships exist but are not observed by the researcher. First, we theoretically illustrate
the bias in estimated marginal costs due to not accounting for the alignment of pricing
incentives between licensors and licensees and demonstrate the resulting ambiguous direction
x
of bias in prediction of merger effects. Second, using market simulations, we analyze these
biases in two types of mergers in markets with patent licensing: licensor-licensee mergers
and licensee-licensee mergers. For both types of mergers, we find that a mis-specified model
that does not incorporate existing patent licensing relationships can predict merger effects
that are: i) opposite to the true merger effects that account for existing patent licensing
relationships; ii) typically over-predicted. Furthermore, we characterize the variation in
estimation and prediction biases with respect to royalty rates and the sum of diversion
ratios between a licensor and licensees. The simulation results support the importance of
incorporating patent licensing relationships when modeling markets with relatively large
royalty rates.
The third chapter, “Product Responses to Income-Based Subsidies in the U.S. Infant
Formula Industry”, develops a structural supply and demand model of the infant formula
industry to evaluate the role that endogenous firm product offerings play in determining
equilibrium market outcomes and welfare measures. Using the structural model’s preference
and cost estimates, I evaluate counterfactual scenarios which increase the proportion of infant
formula voucher recipients and show i) the policy’s negative effect on consumers without




Equilibrium and Welfare Implications of Store Brands in Vertical
Markets
1.1 Introduction
Retailers are intermediaries between the production of goods by manufacturers and the
consumption of those goods by consumers. Acting in complementary roles in the vertical
supply chain, retailers’ and manufacturers’ incentives in the vertical supply chain are aligned
in producing and selling, respectively, final goods to consumers. If these aligned incentives
improve variety, enhance quality, or lower costs, consumers benefit. However, the alignment
of incentives may critically divert when retailers additionally compete horizontally with
manufacturers in the production of goods. Retailers then face a tradeoff between reselling
manufacturers’ products and selling their own. In this chapter, I assess the equilibrium
implications of retailers’ joint role as a vertical intermediary for, and a horizontal competitor
to, upstream manufacturers.
This question of what effect does a retailer jointly selling products from arm’s-length
manufacturers and their own integrated offerings have on a market has recently entered pol-
icy discussions. For example, scrutiny over Amazon’s use of data on third-party sellers have
recently come from antitrust authorities in both the U.S. and European Union.1 Though,
intermediaries that play a dual role of being a retailer as well as integrated with the manu-
1For example, see “Amazon to Face Antitrust Charges From EU Over Treatment of Third-Party Sellers”,
Valentina Pop and Sam Schechner, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2020.
1
facture of goods predates ecommerce. For example, brick and mortar grocers have, for more
than twenty years, sold “store brands”2 alongside national branded products.
These store brand products are owned exclusively by a retailer, which govern their pro-
duction and sale. In some settings, retailers are fully integrated with upstream production.3
Alternatively, the production of some store brand goods is contracted out to third-party
producers. However, retailers maintain strict control over the production process, including
specifying product features, labeling, and terms of distribution, despite sourcing at arm’s-
length. In either case, store brands, relative to national brands, empirically exhibit lower
prices, higher retail margins, less advertising, and are typically not subject to trade al-
lowances or slotting fees.4
In this chapter, I evaluate the effect of intermediaries jointly selling their own products
as well as those from national manufacturers by empirically studying the implications of
store brands in the U.S. yogurt industry. Though, my findings and the associated policy
implications can generalize to other contexts, from other retail product categories to policy-
relevant settings such as ecommerce.
This chapter contributes to economics and marketing literatures in three ways. First,
I extend the literature that assess the pricing and product mix effects of store brands by
exploiting a rich panel dataset of retailers spanning the U.S. in a reduced-form analysis
of store brand entry. This adds to the literature assessing retailer pricing responses, for
both upstream wholesale prices and downstream retail prices, of store brand introductions,
which includes Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004) and Meza and Sudhir (2010). Relatedly,
I am able to additionally use my reduced-form framework to show product responses to
store brand introductions, as in Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) and Scott-Morton and
2Often also referred to as “private label”, “own brand”, “generic”, or “unbranded” products. For unifor-
mity throughout this paper, I refer to these products as store brands.
3For example, in their 2013 10K, The Kroger Company states, “Approximately 40% of [store brands]
sold are produced in the [Kroger’s] manufacturing plants; the remaining...are produced to [Kroger’s] strict
specifications by outside manufacturers.”
4Slotting fees are one-time lump sum payments paid by manufacturers to a retailer in exchange for placing
a certain product on the retailer’s shelf.
2
Zettelmeyer (2004). Second, I use a structural model that incorporates manufacturers and
retailers, drawing from the empirical literature on vertical relationships, as in Villas-Boas
(2007), Asker (2016), Miravete, Seim, and Thurk (2017), Hristakeva (2019), and Luco and
Marshall (2020). Third, I contribute to the literature of evaluating the welfare effects of new
products, specifically store brands. This literature spans from Hausman (1994) and Petrin
(2002) that evaluate the welfare effects of new products to two papers on store brands most
closely related to this chapter: Ellickson, Kong, and Lovett (2018) and Gross (2019). These
latter two papers quantify the welfare effects from store brands by employing an upstream
bargaining model requiring the assumption that retailers face zero marginal costs of retailing.
I relax this assumption in my structural model, given, in my empirical context, retailing of a
perishable good requires noted costs that scale with quantities sold, such as refrigeration and
stocking costs. Additionally, I differ from these papers by incorporating retailer competition
in my structural modeling. In whole, this chapter combines a theoretical, descriptive, and
structural approach that assesses equilibrium effects and quantifies the welfare effects of store
brands in oligopoly.
To state concisely, my primary research question is: what role do store brands play
in determining equilibrium pricing and associated welfare in successive oligopoly? As a
corollary, I also investigate how these effects depend on market concentration.
I first use a simplified theoretical model to show that the addition of a store brand to a
retailer’s product set has ambiguous welfare effects, motivating an empirical investigation of
this question. Using the empirical context of the U.S. industry for yogurt, I conduct both
descriptive and structural exercises to evaluate the role store brands play in determining
equilibrium and welfare outcomes. First, using an event study framework, I show that, after
store brand yogurts are introduced, retailers increase the prices of national brand product
lines. I then develop a structural model to run counterfactual simulations showing the
existence of yogurt store brands increase total surplus – increasing consumer surplus and
(most) retailers’ profits, while decreasing manufacturer profits. Finally, I show that under
3
increased upstream concentration, the total welfare benefits of store brands increase.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as such: Section 1.2 develops a theoretical
model to evaluate how store brands can impact welfare. Section 1.3 describes the empirical
setting and data use in the empirical analysis. Section 1.4 shows the suggestive evidence of
the effects of store brands exploiting observed store brand introductions. Sections 1.5 and
1.6 present the structural model and details how the parameters are estimated. Sections 1.7
and 1.8 show the estimation and counterfactual results. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Theory
In this section, I use a theoretical framework to assess whether store brands are unambigu-
ously welfare enhancing or welfare diminishing. I first discuss how a retailer’s use of store
brands can impact equilibrium outcomes and propose that the equilibrium and welfare ef-
fects of store brands depend on the competitive environment. I then formalize a theoretical
model of a vertical market that allows me to conduct two sets of simulation-based compara-
tive static exercises: first, what happens to welfare outcomes when a store brand is added?
Second, what happens to welfare outcomes when a store brand replaces a national brand
product? I show that, depending on model parameters, the strategic use of store brands can
increase or decrease total surplus. I use this theoretical evidence as motivation to engage in
an empirical investigation of my research question.
1.2.1 Qualitative Discussion
When a store brand is added to the consumer’s choice set, product variety increases, which
benefits consumers, all else equal. However, manufacturers and retailers may reoptimize
respective wholesale and retail prices upon the addition of a store brands – and it is not
determinate how these prices would change. On one hand, if the introduction of a store
brand, providing the retailer and consumer with a viable substitute to national brands, acted
as a constraint on national brand manufacturers markups, theory would predict a decrease
in upstream markups. If the decrease in markups are passed through to decreased retail
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prices, consumers benefit. Alternatively, the retailer, upon introducing a store brand, could
increase retail markups, and thus retail prices, on national brand products. This strategy
may be profitable for the retailer if this increase in national brand prices, at the detriment
of consumers, sufficiently diverts demand to higher-margin store brand products.
Comparing a market with a vertically integrated store brand product in place of a national
branded product, theory would predict similar ambiguity in prices, and thus welfare. First,
vertical integration eliminates double margins. That is, relative to arms-length transacting
which results in successive markups when firms have market power, vertical integration aligns
the upstream and downstream firms incentives. In doing so, the integrated firm internalizes
the upstream markup on the profits of the downstream firm. Then, optimally, the integrated
firm sets no upstream markup, resulting in a total markup that is less than the “double
successive markup. In this case, consumers benefit from both the direct effect of a lower
store brand retail price, but also, indirectly from resulting downward pricing pressure on
retail prices of other products. However, if this coordination between production and sale
were instead to result in higher prices, or alternatively, reduced quality or elimination of other
national brand products, the welfare effects of replacing a national brand with an identical
integrated one would be ambiguous. Higher non-store brand product prices may result if the
integrated retailer disadvantaged the sale of these products in favor of store brands through
higher markups (as discussed above) or exploitation of access to competitively sensitive
information. Additionally, consumers could face a reduction in quality of national brands,
for example, if the retailer reduced its promotional activity for these products, or outright
foreclosure by the retailer, which would result in the elimination of these products from the
consumer choice set.
The mechanisms discussed above suggest an ambiguous welfare effect of store brands,
whether in addition to or in lieu of national brands. To formally demonstrate this welfare
ambiguity, I next turn to a theoretical model which I describe, solve, and then use to conduct
simulation-based comparative static exercises.
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1.2.2 Theoretical Model
I develop a theoretical model with sequential profit-maximizing price setting, with, first,
manufacturer(s) setting upstream price(s), and, second, a monopolist retailer setting down-
stream price(s). Based on downstream prices, consumers choose between the product (or
outside option) that yields the highest utility. I write down and solve the model backward.
First, consumer demand for product j given by the logit form,
sj =
exp{αpj + βxj + ξj}
1 +
∑
k∈J exp{αpk + βxk + ξk}
(1.1)
where demand parameters α and β, which are common across consumers, measure sen-
sitivity to retail price, pj, and an observable exogenous product attribute, xj. Finally, ξj is
a scalar product-specific utility shifter.
Given demand, a monopolist retailer, with product set J , sets retail prices by maximizing




(pj − pwj − cj)sj (1.2)






(pj′ − cj′) = 0 (1.3)
Profits for the single good (non-integrated) manufacturer are given by
πmj = (p
w
j − cwj )sj with cwj = γxj + ωj (1.4)
Then manufacturers set upstream prices to maximize these profits subject to the retailer’s
first order condition, as specified in (1.3).
In this setup, welfare for suppliers, i.e., producer surplus, is the sum of manufacturer and
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the monopolist retailer profits. Consumer welfare is given by a measure of consumer surplus,







exp{αpj + βxj + ξj}
)
+ C (1.5)
Where C is an arbitrary constant.
1.2.3 Comparative Statics
With this simple theoretical model, I analyze equilibrium outcomes under various market
structures to assess the impact of store brands on welfare. I consider two baseline scenarios
without store brands and one comparative scenario with a store brand present. Specifically,
I consider,
A1: One product supplied by an arm’s-length manufacturer (j = 1)
A2: Two products supplied by two separate arm’s-length, single-product manufacturers
(j = 1, 2)
B: One product supplied by an arm’s-length manufacturer (j = 1) and one store brand
product supplied by an integrated manufacturer (j = 3)
The baseline scenarios (Scenarios A1 and A2) aim to understand equilibrium outcomes
in markets without store brands, i.e., no integration between manufacturer(s) and retailer.
I then compare these outcomes to those under a market with a single store brand good
(Scenario B). Moving from scenario A1 and B allows me to assess what happens to market
outcomes when a store brand is added. Alternatively, the comparison between A2 and B
shows the changes in equilibria when a store brand replaces a national brand.
Using a simulation approach, for each scenario A1, A2, and B, I calculate optimal prices,
both wholesale, pwj , and retail, pj, for manufacturer(s) and the monopolist retailer under
a given vector of model parameter values, including consumer preference parameters (α
and β), cost parameters (cj, γ and ωj), and product attributes (xj and ξj). Solving for
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equilibrium wholesale and retail prices allows me to calculate product quantites, and, thus
in turn, manufacturer profits (from (1.4)), retailer profits (from (1.2)), and consumer surplus
(from (1.5)). I calculate total surplus as the sum of manufacturer profits, retailer profits,
and consumer surplus. I then repeat this process, solving for the equilibrium and associated
welfare measures, for each vector within a specified range of the model’s parameter space.
As can be seen from Figure 1.1, when adding a store brand (i.e., moving from Scenario
A1 to B), for all considered vectors of parameters, equilibrium retailer profits increase and
equilibrium total surplus increases. In this case, for all vectors of model parameters consid-
ered, it is both profitable and total surplus enhancing when a retailer adds a store brand
product alongside an existing national brand product.5
When comparing Scenarios A2 to B, as can be seen from Figure 1.2, replacing one of
two existing national brand products with a store brand may either increase or decrease
retailer profits. Equilibria in which the retailer’s profits decrease upon replacement of a
national brand with a store brand are shown on the left-hand side of the plot. Whenever
this replacement occurs where a retailer is worse off, total surplus decreases. Alternatively,
for equilibria where the retailer gains from a product replacement, total surplus can either
increase or decrease. In the upper right quadrant, retailer profits and total surplus increase
upon the replacement of a national brand with a store brand. However, in the lower right
quadrant, we see a small mass of equilibria where it is profitable for the retailer to replace
a national brand with a store brand despite this action resulting in lower total surplus. For
these equilibria, the retailer’s incentives deviate from the objective of the social planner to
maximize total surplus.6
Given the demonstrated welfare ambiguity of adding a store brand, either independently,
or in replacing an identical national brand product, I turn to an empirical setting in which I
investigate my research question. In the next section, I describe the setting and associated
5However, the addition of a store brand is not necessarily a Pareto improvement, as, in many simulations,
manufacturer profits decrease. See Appendix A.1.1.
6Consumer surplus and manufacturer profit comparisons can be found in Appendix A.1.1.
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data. Then, I evaluate actual changes in products sets and their impact on observed equilib-
rium outcomes using an event study framework. Finally, I develop and estimate a vertical
structural model that allows for counterfactual simulations to assess the causal effect of store
brands on welfare.
1.3 Empirical Setting and Data Description
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the effect of store brands on competition shown in the
previous section, I take this research question to an empirical setting. Specifically, I study
the role of store brands in the US grocery market for yogurt. Below, I describe this market
and the attributes that make it an ideal setting to study this research question. I then detail
the data used in the remainder of the chapter.
1.3.1 US Yogurt Industry
I use the US yogurt industry as my empirical context in this chapter. This market exhibits
several desirable features to empirically analyze this research question. First, during the
sample period, the market exhibited a proliferation of both store brand and national brand
products. This allows me to assess responses to product introductions. Relatedly, retailer
assortments are heterogeneous amongst both store and national branded yogurt products,
providing useful variation when estimating demand parameters. Second, the upstream mar-
ket is relatively concentrated, with the largest three firms comprising approximately 55% of
industry revenues, allowing me to examine the effect of store brands where manufacturers
have market power. Third, the final good product – consumer packaged yogurt – due to
its inherent properties, has a limited shelf life once produced. This supports modeling the
market statically since producers, retailer, and consumers are not able to stockpile yogurt,
and thus supply and demand behavior can reasonably abstract from dynamic considera-
tions. Finally, I have detailed data on quantities, expenditure, and product availability of
yogurt products at the retail level, which allows me to evaluate observed market outcomes
descriptively and fit a model to this data to run counterfactual simulations.
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1.3.2 Data Sources
My empirical analysis relies on data from a variety of sources. First, I use point-of-sale data
on yogurt products sold in retail stores in the U.S. from 2006–2016 from Nielsen’s Retail
Scanner Dataset. This scanner data includes quantities sold and consumer expenditures at
the weekly-store-universal product code (“UPC”) level for yogurt products. For my empirical
analysis, I aggregate this data to quarter-retail banner-product line within a designated
market area (“DMA”).7 I define a product line as a collection UPCs which are the same
brand (including retailer store brands) and share the same combination of observable product
characteristics, including whether the yogurt is Greek and its fat content (i.e., low-fat, non-
fat, or full fat).8 For a given product line, I calculate the average price per standard serving
by multiplying 6 ounces times the ratio of total consumer expenditure on UPCs within the
product line to the total volume sold (in ounces) in a DMA-retailer-quarter.
I also use data on wholesale transactions of yogurt from PromoData PriceTrak. The
PriceTrak data records the wholesale transacted prices of products in 41 cities for a single
distributor per market between 2005–2012. I can match this data to product line-quarter
retail sales from the scanner data described above; however, I am unfortunately not able
to match these wholesale transactions to specific retailers. So, for a given observation in
the scanner data sample, the associated matched wholesale transaction is not necessarily
the price at which that retailer purchased that product in the upstream market. Instead, it
represents a contemporaneous transaction price for that same product in the same market for
some retailer (which could be the retailer of the matched scanner data observation, albeit
coincidentally). Despite the limitations of perfectly matching to the scanner data, this
wholesale data still provides a glimpse of the upstream market, which is often unobservable
to researchers.
7Nielsen defines a DMA as an exclusive collection of counties, “in which the home market television
stations hold a dominance of total hours viewed”. DMAs roughly correspond to major metropolitan areas
and are nearly exhaustive of the entirety of U.S., with only some areas of Alaska not included.
8Flavors vary between UPCs within a product line.
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I supplement the scanner and wholesale data with data from publicly available sources.
I use household counts by county from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community
Survey, which I aggregate to the DMA-level to quantify potential market size for a given
DMA-quarter. I also gather data on input costs, including state-level industrial energy
prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, and state-level industrial food
manufacturing wages from the U.S. Census Annual Survey of Manufacturers, which are used
to construct the instruments used in estimation (as described in Section 1.3). Finally, I hand
collect additional product attributes and manufacturer plant location for use in estimating
the structural model, as described in Section 1.6.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. The top panel of the table shows
the average and dispersion of product line characteristics, including price. The middle three
panels describe the competitive environment: the prevalence of products, retailers, and
manufacturers in the sample. Finally, the bottom two panels detail the number of geographic
markets, time periods, and observations.
The yogurt product lines in the sample have an average retail price of $1.00 per size ounce
serving and standard deviation $0.46.9 Approximately one third (34%) of product lines in
the sample are Greek, which exhibit an average price of $1.25 per six ounces (not shown in
table). The yogurt product lines are nearly evenly split between the mutually exclusive and
exhaustive attributes of non-fat (31%), low-fat (34%), and full-fat (31%).
The average number of retailers per DMA-quarter is 4.69, each of which exhibit an average
of 20.96 product lines per DMA-quarter from 5.97 different manufacturers, on average. In
total, the sample spans 205 DMAs and 44 quarters, comprising 878,678 product line-retailer-
DMA-quarter observations.
1.4 Reduced-Form Evidence:Store Brand Introductions Event Study
We can assess how observed introductions of store brands impact pricing of national brands
prior to and following an introduction of a (set of) store brand product line(s). For a
9For the 11% of the product lines which are store brands, the average price is $0.64 (not shown in table).
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given retailer-DMA, I define a store brand introduction as a period where the retailer-DMA
exhibits positive sales of any store brand product lines and did not exhibit any store brand
sales in four prior quarters. For example, if retailer A exhibits non-zero revenues from store
brand yogurt in DMA 1 during 2012Q1, and no revenues from store brand yogurt between
2011Q1-2011Q4, I denote a store brand introduction for retailer A in DMA 1 occurred in
2012Q1.
Formally, I define an introduction indicator for retailer r in DMA d at time t as,
Irdt = 1{qjrdt > 0,
∑
τ∈{t−4,..,t−1}
qjrτd = 0, ∀j ∈ Jstorerdt } (1.6)
Where Jstorerdt represents retailer r’s set of product lines that are store brands in market d at
time t.
In my sample, I record 256 instances of a retailer, within a specific DMA, introduce at
least one store brand yogurt product line, according to the definition above. The introduc-
tions occur for 15 different retailers, in 147 different DMAs, and in 30 different quarters.
The average number of store brand product lines introduced during an introduction event is
1.47 product lines.
1.4.1 National Brand Pricing
As we are interested in how national brand prices change around the retailer’s introduction
of store brand product lines, we can conduct a two-way fixed effects event study analysis on
national brand retail prices.
log(pjrdt) = ζ +
∑
τ∈{t−T,...,t−2,0,..,t+T}
φτIrτd + ζjrd + ζt + εjrdt (1.7)
The coefficient φ−1 is normalized to zero. Then the coefficients φτ for τ ∈ {t− T, ..., t−
2, 0, .., t + T} indicate how much, on average, retail prices of branded product lines change
with respect to an introduction of store brand product line τ quarters from the introduction,
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relative to prices one quarter prior to the introduction.
The coefficient estimates φ̂τ are plotted in Figure 1.3. We see that, following store brand
product line introductions, on average, retail prices of national brands increase and this
increase is sustained in subsequent quarters. For example, in the third quarter after an
introduction, on average, national brand retail prices are 4.78% higher than in the period
prior to introduction (φ̂2) = 0.0477.
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The event study exercise assesses changes in market outcomes around the time of observed
retailer store brand introductions to provide suggestive evidence of equilibrium effects. How-
ever, retailer-DMAs may condition outcome variables, say national brand retailer prices, on
anticipated store brand introductions. Thus, I do not claim the estimated coefficients repre-
sent casual effects, but rather descriptive of observed behavior and suggestive of equilibrium
effects. To capture causal equilibrium effects, and to quantify the welfare effects of store
brands, I turn to a full structural model in the next section.
1.5 Empirical Model
In order to establish casual effects and quantify welfare effects of store brands, I extend the
theoretical model in Section 1.2 to develop a full structural model of manufacturers, retailers,
and consumers decision making in the US yogurt industry. I solve the model and match it
to observed market outcomes, including retailer prices and quantities, and input costs, to
recover structural parameters governing demand and supply behavior. I then use the model
and estimated parameters to conduct counterfactual simulations in Section 1.8, which allows
me to assess the welfare implications of store brands in the US yogurt market.
I model interactions in this market as a repeated static game. In each period t, in each
geographic market d, the following subgame is played:
1. Manufacturers and retailers observe demand shocks
10The 95% confidence interval for φ̂2 is (0.0257, 0.0697), which suggests that the positive price differ-
ence between national brand prices three quarters after an introduction and right before an introduction is
statistically different from zero.
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2. Manufacturers set wholesale prices
3. Given wholesale prices and demand shocks, retailers set retail prices
4. Given retail prices, consumers make purchase (or not) decisions
Within each subgame, I solve the model by backwards induction. As such, I will first
describe the demand system capturing consumer behavior and then the supply model of
retailer competition and manufacturer competition, respectively.
1.5.1 Demand
In each geographic market d, in each period t, consumers face a choice set of available yogurt
product lines, Jdt. As described in Section 1.3, I define a product line as a unique combination
of brand b ∈ {1, ..., Bdt} and observable non-price binary attributes. In addition to product
lines observed in the data, consumers may choose the outside option, which I index as j = 0.
Additionally, I assume that consumers only purchase one product line at a time, abstracting
from multiple discrete choice.
Household i’s latent utility in DMA d at time t from purchasing and consuming product
line j from retailer r is given by
Vijrdt = αipjrdt + xjβi + ξjrdt + εijrdt (1.8)
The retail price of product line j at retailer r in DMA d in time t faced by consumers
is given by pjrdt.
11 The observable product attributes of product line j is given by xj ≡
(xj,1, .., xj,K), which is invariant to retailer, market, and time.
These observable product characteristics are scaled by random coefficients, representing
tastes that are allowed to differ between households. The random coefficient αi is the house-
holds (dis)taste of price. Similarly, the vector βi ≡ (βi,1, ..., βi,k)′ represents the household’s
taste for each observable product characteristic k ∈ {1, ..., K}. These random coefficients
11Retail prices for the same manufacturer’s product are allowed to vary between two different retailers, a
pattern which is observed in the data.
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allow the demand system to capture heterogeneity between households. I decompose these




 α + σανα,i
βk + σβkνβk,i

for k ∈ {1, ..., K}. The mean of the random coefficient terms, α and β ≡ (β1, ..., βk)′,
represent the average taste across households for price and product attributes, respectively.
The random variables να,i and νβk,i follow standard normal distributions and are scaled by
the (positive) cofficients σα and σβk to allow for differences in tastes between households.
The joint distribution of (αi, βi) is represented by F .
The utility specification also includes a demand shifter, ξjrdt, which is unobserved by the
econometrician but observed by firms. I decompose the demand shifter into retailer, time,
and DMA-brand fixed effects and a residual,
ξjrdt ≡ ξr + ξt + ξd,brandj + ∆ξjrdt (1.9)
This decomposition allows for tastes of the same yogurt products to flexibly vary between
retailers and between time periods. Further, by including a DMA-brand fixed effect, I allow
for consumers in one geographic market to have different mean preferences over a given
brand of yogurt product lines than consumers in other geographic markets. This accounts
for regional preferences for specific brands, for example, if customers in West Coast markets
have stronger preference for health-oriented brands.
Finally, the demand specification includes an additively separable household-product-
retailer-DMA-quarter taste shifter, εijrdt, which follows a Type I extreme value distribution.
As an assumption, I normalize the utility of the outside good to Vi0rdt = εi0rdt.
As is standard in the literature, I assume the consumer chooses the single product line or
outside good with the highest utility from the set of available product line choices. Product
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line market shares can then be inverted as,
sjrdt(pdt,x, ξ) =
∫
exp{αipjrdt + xjβi + ξjrdt}
1 +
∑
k∈Jdt exp{αipkrdt + xkβi + ξkrdt}
dF (αi, βi) (1.10)
Where retail prices for product lines in DMA-market dt are collected into the vector
pdt. Similarly, vectors x and ξ collect observable and unobservable product characteristics,
respectively.
As will be described in Section 1.6, equation (1.10) is matched to observed market shares
to estimate the demand parameters that govern the household’s utility function.
1.5.2 Supply
I next turn to the supply model, which details how of manufacturers and retailers set up-
stream and downstream prices, respectively. Since retailers take wholesale prices as given, I
first solve the downstream retailer’s problem, conditional on upstream prices, and then move
to the upstream manufacturer’s problem.
Retailer




Mdtsjrdt(pdt,x; θ)(pjrdt − cjrdt − pwjrdt) (1.11)
Where, for product j at time t in market d, pjrdt is the per-unit retail price paid by
consumers to retailer r, cjrdt is the per-unit cost of retailing, and p
w
jrdt is the wholesale
per-unit price paid by retailer r. The potential size of market d at time t is given by Mdt.
For store brands, I assume no wholesale markup and thus set pwjrdt = c
w for j ∈ Jstorerdt .
Though I do not observe wholesale prices for store brand products to empirically evaluate this
assumption, it is reasonable assumption given evidence that large retailers do source store
brands through their own production capabilities. With full vertical integration, retailers
internalize the upstream markup and thus optimally set pwjrdt = c
w. Alternatively, when
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retailers opt for arm’s-length sourcing of store brands, particularly in the yogurt product
category, retailers solicit bids from multiple manufacturers who compete on price to produce
a store brand product with given attributes specified by the retailer. This competition in
wholesale price between manufacturers, many “private label manufacturers” with limited
market power, over a standardized offering drives wholesale prices close to, if not equal to,
production costs, cw, for store brand yogurt products.
Conditional on wholesale prices, retailers compete a la Nash-Bertrand in retail prices. I
assume a pure-strategy equilibrium, in which retailers follow the first order condition of the






(pjrdt − cjrdt − pwjrdt) = 0 (1.12)
Stacking and rearranging terms,
p = c + pw + (−Or ∗∆r)−1s(p,x; θ) (1.13)
Where the vector of retail prices is given by p, wholesale prices by pw, retailer marginal
costs by c, retailer ownership Or(j, j′) ≡ 1{j, j′ ∈ Jrdt}, and the partial derivative matrix of




We next solve the manufacturer’s problem. Similar to retailers, manufacturers compete
Nash-Bertrand in wholesale prices. However, given the timing assumption that manufac-
turers set wholesale prices prior to retailers, manufacturers take into account the response
of retail prices when setting wholesale prices. Specifically, manufacturers know retail price
setting will observe equation (1.13). Thus, we can write manufacturer m’s problem as max-









jrdt − cwjrdt) (1.14)
subject to p = c + pw + (−Or ∗∆r)−1s(p,x; θ) (1.15)
Manufacturer first order conditions with respect to wholesale prices are given by,
s(p(pw)) + (Om ∗∆m)(pw − c) = 0 (1.16)
where retail prices p are implicitly a function of wholesale prices pw through retailer
first order conditions (1.13). The matrix that captures manufacturer product ownership
structure, Om, with elements Om(j, j′) ≡ 1{j, j′ ∈ Jmdt}, is element-wise multiplied (“∗”)
by the response matrix ∆m, which captures how market shares change with respect to to











Where the partial derivative of retail prices with respect to wholesale prices (i.e., the second
partial derivative in the sum)12 is determined implicitly from (1.13), as in Villas-Boas (2007).
Marginal Costs
Combining the retailer and manufacturer first order conditions (1.13) and (1.16) gives total
marginal costs as observed prices less the total vertical markup implied by the model,
mc ≡ c + cw = p− µr(p, x, ξ; θ)− µm(p, x, ξ; θ) (1.18)
12 For j = j′, this derivative gives a measure of how a product line’s wholesale price is passed through to
its retail price.
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where retailer and manufacturer markups, respectively, are given by,
µr(p, x, ξ; θ) ≡ (−Or ∗∆r)−1s(p,x; θ) (1.19)
µm(p, x, ξ; θ) ≡ (−Om ∗∆m)−1s(p,x; θ) (1.20)
From this expression, we see that total marginal costs are a function of observed retail
prices, p, and markup terms, which depend on market shares, s, ownership structure, Or
and Om, and response matrices implied by the demand model and demand parameters, θ.
Thus it follows that, once demand parameters are estimated, the vector of total marginal
cost can be recovered and taken as a structural object for counterfactual analysis. The next
section describes this process in detail.
1.6 Estimation and Identification
Estimation of the empirical model involves first estimating demand and using these demand
estimates, in conjunction with the supply model, to recover marginal costs. The demand
parameters that govern consumer utility are estimated following the methods of estimat-
ing random coefficient logit demand systems due to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
Marginal costs are then determined as the difference between observed prices and optimal
markups implied by estimated demand parameters and the observed market structural.
1.6.1 Demand Parameters
Estimation Procedure
Estimation of the parameters of the demand model follows the generalized method of mo-
ments (“GMM”) procedure of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
For a guess of σ, I first determine the mean utilities, δ(σ), that match observed (i.e.,
data) and model-implied shares using the contraction mapping from Berry (1994). Then,
following Nevo (2001), I recover estimates of the mean taste and fixed effect parameters,
(α̂, β̂, ξ̂), as the first order condition of regressing the given δ(σ) on these parameters. The
19
estimating equation is,
δjrdt(σ) = αpjrdt + xjβ + ξr + ξt + ξd,brandj + ∆ξjrdt (1.21)
This “concentrating out” of mean taste and fixed effect parameters in the inner loop of
the estimation routine allows me to construct demand shocks implied by the candidate value
of σ as the residual vector, ∆ξ(σ). In the outer loop of the estimation procedure, I search
for the value of the random coefficient variance parameters, σ ≡ (σα, σβ), which minimizes
the GMM objective function,
σ̂ = arg min
σ
∆ξ(σ)′ZWZ ′∆ξ(σ) (1.22)
Where Z is a vector of instruments, as detailed below, and W is the optimal weight
matrix.13
Instrument Construction
Given the assumption that retailers observed demand shocks prior to setting prices, I must
address the issue of price endogeneity when estimating demand parameters. To do so, I em-
ploy two sets of instrumental variables: input costs and measures of product differentiation.
To construct instruments based on input costs, I first collect publicly available information
on the geographic location of production facilities of brands in my data. For brands associ-
ated with multiple production facilities, I assume the brand’s product lines were produced at
the production facility closest to DMA in which the product line was sold.14 Understanding
where a given product line sold in a given market-quarter was produced allows me to proxy
for contemporaneous input prices. Namely, I use state-level average wages for food produc-
13To construct the optimal weight matrix, I use a two-step estimation procedure that first recovers an esti-
mate of σ, call it σ̃1, using a first step weight matrix, W1 = (Z
′Z)−1. I then plug in the demand shocks implied
by σ̃1 from this first step estimate to construct the optimal weight matrix, W2 = (Z
′∆ξ(σ̃1)∆ξ(σ̃1)
′Z)−1.
To recover final parameter estimates, I re-run the estimation procedure described above substituting W2 in
the GMM objective function in (1.22).
14For store brands, I assign the state of the nearest observed national brand production facility.
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tion workers from the US Census Annual Survey of Manufacturers and average industrial
electricity prices from the US Energy Information Association. The validity of these input
cost instruments to identify the endogenous regressor, α, relies on two conditions: i) input
costs are uncorrelated with demand shocks, ∆ξjrdt; and ii) pass-through of input costs to
retail prices is nonzero. These conditions appear reasonable in my empirical context.
Additionally, I construct instruments measuring a product line’s degree of differentiation
in the product attribute space. Namely, for each non-linear product characteristic, I deter-
mine the number of other product lines that share a product line’s product characteristic in
a given market-period. As suggested by Ghandi and Houde (2019), this instrument measures
the degree to which a given product line is isolated in the product space. Given that equi-
librium retail prices depend on the competitive environment, specifically the prevalence of
close substitutes, these instruments are correlated with observed retail prices. Additionally,
it is reasonable to assume that a product’s demand shock, particularly after controlling for a
rich set of fixed effects, is uncorrelated with the number of “nearby” products in the product
attribute space.
1.6.2 Marginal Costs
In order to calculate equilibrium prices under counterfactual scenarios, I must recover un-
observed total vertical marginal costs under the factual environment. To do so, I rely on
the assumptions in the supply model to “back out” marginal costs as the difference between
prices and the total vertical markup implied by the model and demand estimations. From the
combined retailer and manufacturer first order conditions given in equation (1.18), marginal
costs estimates are given by,
m̂cjrdt = pjrdt − µrjrdt(pdt,xdt, ξdt; θ̂)− µmjrdt(pdt,xdt, ξdt; θ̂) (1.23)
As can be seen in equation (1.19), the retailer markup term, µr(·) consist of three com-
ponents: retailer product ownership, the response matrix, and product line market shares.
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Ownership and market shares are taken directly from the data. The elements of the response
matrix, ∆r, which are derivatives of market shares with respect to prices, are implied by the
supply model. In practice, I calculate these derivatives by simulating over household draws
over the estimated distribution of demand parameters.
Similarly, the manufacturer markup term, as shown in equation (1.20), is a function of
the manufacturer product ownership, response matrix, and market shares. Again, I take
factual market shares and observed ownership. Here, since the vertical structure of store
brands is assumed to be equivalent to full integration, upstream markups on store brands
product lines are zero and are thus omitted from the calculation of manufacturer markups.
The response matrix, ∆m, as shown in equation (1.17), expresses the response of market
shares to wholesale prices (as opposed to retail prices). This object, as discussed in Villas-
Boas (2007), requires the calculation of the Hessian of market shares with respect to prices.




Demand estimates are included in Table 1.2. The estimate of the mean coefficient on price,
α̂ = −8.89, is the expected sign, indicating consumers’ disutility of price. Further, the
estimate of the random coefficient on price, σ̂α = 0.61 is statistically different than zero,
implying consumer heterogeneity in (dis)taste for price. The estimates for non-price observ-
able characteristic imply, on average, consumers do not prefer Greek yogurt product lines
and consumers prefer full fat (omitted group) to non-fat and low-fat product lines. However,
consumers exihibit heterogeneity is these preferences, such that there is a non-trivial mass of
consumers that prefer Greek to non-Greek product lines, all else equal (i.e., for draws of the
normally distributed random variable νβGreek > 1.42/4.12 = 0.34). Similarly, the parameter
estimates imply a non-zero mass of consumers prefer non-fat and low-fat product lines.
22
As a check, I calculate the own price elasticities for each DMA-retailer-product line in
my sample at the demand parameter point estimates. The median product line own price
elasticity is -8.80, which is slightly less than previous papers that study the same industry.
However, these demand estimates do not generate any product line price elasticities which
are greater than zero.
As I include DMA-brand coefficients in my demand specification, estimation of demand
does not admit a single parameter that captures the taste for store brands. Instead, these
DMA-brand coefficients flexibly capture the taste for individual store (and national) brands
in each geographic market in my sample.15 Therefore, to gain an aggregate sense of consumer
preferences for store brands, I plot the estimate of each of these fixed effects. Figure 1.4 shows
a histogram of these DMA-brand coefficients, grouped by store and national brands.
The average of national brand DMA-brand fixed effects is larger than that of store brands.
This conforms to industry knowledge that, all else equal, consumers generally prefer national
brands to store brands. However, the dispersion of fixed effects within each group indicate
heterogeneity in taste for both different national brands and store brands. Additionally, some
store brand-DMA fixed effects are greater than some national brand-DMA fixed effects.
1.7.2 Marginal Cost Estimates
Once demand parameters are estimated, total vertical marginal costs (i.e., combined marginal
cost of production and retailing) can be calculated from equation (1.23) (Section 1.6.2) as
observed prices less retailer and manufacturer markups. I calculate retailer and manufac-
turer markups for each product line in my sample by evaluating equations (1.19) and (1.20)
at the demand parameter point estimates. The median manufacturer markup is $0.12 and
the median retailer markup is $0.12.16
Most strikingly, the marginal cost estimates differ between Greek and non-Greek yogurt
15Within a DMA, I include a different fixed effect for each retailer store brand product lines to allow for
different average preferences over between retailers. For example, in DMA 1, non-fat Greek store brand
yogurt at retailer A has a different fixed effect than non-fat Greek store brand yogurt at retailer B
16By assumption, manufacturer markups on store brand product lines are zero.
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products, as plotted in Figure 1.5. Given the production of Greek yogurt requires an addi-
tional step of straining liquid whey from regular yogurt, we would expect the marginal cost
of production for Greek yogurt product lines to be more than non-Greek. As Figure 1.5
shows, this pattern is borne out in the marginal cost estimates – marginal costs for Greek
yogurt product lines are, on average, larger than non-Greek.
1.8 Counterfactual Simulations
I use the structural model, as well as the model’s estimated demand and cost parameters,
to simulate consumer, retailer, and manufacturer responses to alternative scenarios and the
resulting market outcomes to directly assess the equilibrium and welfare implications of store
brands in the US yogurt industry.
The first counterfactual assesses the equilibrium and welfare effects of store brands un-
der the observed product line ownership structure. I conduct a counterfactual simulation in
which I eliminate all store brand yogurt product lines from each retailer’s offerings in my
sample. Under this environment, for the remaining set of products, which consist only of na-
tional branded products sold by retailers under the factual scenario, I determine equilibrium
manufacturer markups that follow first order conditions given in (1.16) and retail markups of
remaining products that following equation (1.13). Equilibrium retail prices, which consist
of the total vertical markup over estimated marginal costs, along with product characteris-
tics and estimated taste parameters, determine product market shares from equation (1.10).
Recovering counterfactual markups and product line shares allows me to calculate manu-
facturer and retailer profits. Changes in consumer surplus between the counterfactual and




















dF (αi, βi) (1.24)
where V 1ijrdt equals the utility specified in equation (1.8), evaluated at counterfactual prices,
minus the idiosyncratic taste shifter, εijrdt. Similarly, V
0
ijrdt represents the same utility term
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evaluated at observed factual prices. The set of product lines available to consumers in DMA
d and quarter t is given by J1dt in the counterfactual and J
0
dt in the observed factual.
The second set of counterfactual simulations assess the equilibrium and welfare effects
of store brands under a market structure with higher concentration, namely, after a merger
between upstream manufacturers. To isolate the effect of store brands under higher upstream
market concentration, I first simulate market outcomes under a horizontal merger between
the two largest manufacturers in my sample with the factual product set (i.e., with store
brands). Second, I simulate market outcomes after this same merger and removing store
brands.
Table 1.3 shows the resulting changes in welfare for manufacturers, retailers, and con-
sumers from these counterfactual simulations. The first column of results shows how man-
ufacturer, retailer, and consumer surplus measures change when moving from the factual
world with both national and store brand product lines to a counterfactual scenario where
all retailer store brands are removed. After prices for the remaining national brands are
recalculated for the remaining national brands, manufacturer and retailer profits are deter-
mined, as well as (change in) consumer surplus. Manufacturers benefit from the removal of
store brands, increasing aggregate profits by $151.42 million, while retailers, in aggregate, are
worse off, with profits decreasing by $203.91 million. However, retailers that do not initially
have store brands benefit from the elimination of their competitors’ store brands. More so,
we see that retailers for whom store brand product lines make up a smaller proportion of
their offerings (“low store brand usage retailers”) are not as worse off as those retailers with
higher proportions of store brands (“high store brand usage retailers”).17
In this counterfactual without store brands, consumers are worse off than the factual
17The three subcategories of retailers are mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive. “No store brand
usage retailers” are observations for which a retailer-DMA-quarter does not exhibit any store brand product
lines in their offerings. For the remaining retailer-DMA-quarter observations, I calculate the proportion of a
retailer-DMA-quarter’s product lines that are store brand and take the conditional (on having one or more
store brand) median across my sample, which equals 12.5% of a retailer-DMA-quarter’s product lines. “Low
store brand usage retailers” are those which have a store brand proportion between zero and the median,
12.5%. “High store brand usage retailers” are the remaining retailer-DMA-quarter observations which have
greater than 12.5% of product lines as store brands.
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world with store brands. Without store brands, retail prices for national brands increase.
Additionally, by removing store brands, consumers mechanically face fewer available product
lines to choose from. The reduction in consumer surplus of $935.47 million over the entire
sample is a result of the combination of these factors – higher prices and fewer available
yogurt products lines. Summing over the entire vertical channel, the change in total surplus
due to removing store brands is equal to -$988.47 million.18
I run two additional counterfactuals to assess the how the welfare effects of store brands
change based on upstream concentration. To provide a baseline, I conduct a merger simula-
tion between the two largest manufacturers in my sample, in terms of yogurt revenue, with
factual product sets (i.e., with store and national brands). Under this scenario, the results
for which are shown in column (2) of Table 1.3, both merging and non-merging manufactur-
ers benefit to a combined increase of $40.31 million in surplus. This benefit comes at the
expense of both retailer and consumer surplus, losing $93.50 million and $444.51 million in
surplus, respectively.
I re-run this same merger simulation, now removing store brands. The resulting surplus
changes, relative to the factual environment, for this counterfactual exercise are shown in
column (3) of Table 1.3. Unsurprisingly, manufacturers, both the merged entity and non-
merging firms, realize the largest increase in profits relative to the first two counterfactuals.
Consumers and retailers that sell store brands see the largest decrease in respective surplus
measures. Retailers that do not sell store brands are slightly worse off post-merger and
without store brands relative to the observed factual, but not as worse off than post-merger
with store brands.
To assess how the welfare effects of store brands change under increased market concen-
tration, I compare differences in the reported changes in surplus between the factual and
the observed upstream structure with store brands (column (1)) and between post-merger
with store brands and without store brands (columns (2) and (3)). For manufacturers, post-
18This change in total surplus represents approximately 5% of industry revenues in the U.S. over the three
year period, 2011-2013, for which this counterfactual simulations are conducted.
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merger profits increase more without store brands present for both sets of manufacturers.
For example, for the merging manufacturers, moving from the factual to the pre-merger,
no store brand counterfactual yielded $111.58 million of additional profits. Without store
brands, post-merger profits for the merging firms would have increased by more, specifically
by $116.05 million (=$140.92 million − $24.87 million). Conversely, retailers that initially
exhibited store brand product lines would exhibit a larger decrease in profits when removing
store brands under higher upstream concentration relative to the observed upstream market
structure. Specifically, low usage retailers would exhibit a reduction in profits of $88.91 mil-
lion (relative to $75.55 million without merger) and high usage retailers would realize $149.78
million less profits (relative to $132.01 million). Retailers that do not exhibit store brands in
the factual realize slightly less gain in surplus under higher upstream market concentration
due to the removal of store brands ($3.36 million) relative to without an upstream merger
($3.64 million). Finally, consumer surplus, and resultingly, overall welfare, decreases more
when removing store brand product lines under higher upstream market concentration.
Alternatively, we can use these counterfactual results to assess how the welfare effects
from an upstream merger change when store brands are present versus when they are not.
This welfare comparison is then between i) the pre-merger with store brands (factual) sce-
nario and the post-merger with store brands counterfactual (column (2)) and ii) pre-merger
without store brands (column (1)) and post-merger without store brands (column (3)). In
assessing changes in profits from the merger, both merging and non-merging manufacturers
are better off without store brands, collectively gaining $54.09 million (=$205.51 million −
$151.42 million) in profit from pre- to post-merger without store brands, relative to $40.31
million if the merger occurs with store brands in the market. Conversely, the welfare ef-
fects of the upstream merger for retailers and consumers are worse without store brands.
In aggregate, retailers (consumers) would exhibit a decrease in profits (surplus) of $124.93
million ($582.92 million) if the merger occurred without store brands compared to a smaller
decrease of $93.5 million ($391.32 million) with store brands. Resultingly, total surplus de-
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creases less with store brands ($444.51 million) relative to the decrease in total surplus due
to the upstream merger occurring without store brands ($653.76 million).
In summary, the counterfactual exercises showed that i) the existence of store brands
shifts surplus downstream, from manufacturers to retailers and consumers; ii) this effect is
stronger under increased upstream concentration; and iii) store brands act as a countervailing
force from negative welfare effects of increased upstream concentration, such as a horizontal
merger.
1.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I theoretically motivate and conduct two empirical exercises to evaluate the
effect of store brands on equilibrium outcomes. Using theoretical simulation, I show how
store brands can have ambiguous welfare effects, motiving two empirical exercises. Using
an event study framework, I show that retailer store brand introductions of yogurt are
associated with an increase in both the number of and the prices of national brand product
lines. To evaluate the causal effect of store brand introductions, I develop a structural
model and fit it to scanner data to recover structural demand and cost parameters. I then
evaluate counterfactual scenarios, removing store brands under both the observed upstream
ownership structure and under a simulated merger between two larger manufacturers. The
counterfactual exercise suggests the existence of store brands is welfare enhancing, benefiting
consumers and (most) retailers, while reducing profits for manufacturers. These effects
are shown to be exacerbated if two manufacturers merge, suggesting store brands can act
as a countervailing force to anticompetitive merger effects and yield greater total welfare
improvement in more concentrated industries.
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Table 1.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Characteristics:
Price ($ per 6 oz.) 1.00 0.46 0.002 24.99
Binary characteristics:
Greek 0.34 0.47 0 1
Non-fat 0.35 0.48 0 1
Low-fat 0.34 0.47 0 1
Full-fat 0.31 0.46 0 1
Store brand 0.11 0.31 0 1
Product lines:
Per DMA-retailer-quarter 20.96 15.11 1 69
Per DMA-quarter 45.50 21.36 1 122
Total brands 42 - - -
Total product lines 145 - - -
Retailers:
Per DMA-quarter 4.69 2.46 1 16
Total retailers 146 - - -
Manufacturers:
Per DMA-retailer-quarter 5.97 3.38 1 17
Per DMA-quarter 10.04 3.52 1 21
Total manufacturers 31 - - -
Markets:
Total DMAs 205 - - -
Total quarters 44 - - -
Total DMA-quarters 8,937 - - -
Total observations 878,678 - - -
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% own-elasticity > 0 0.00
Note: Estimation via 2 step GMM with cost shifters (industrial wages and plant-state electricity prices)
and differentiation instruments (number of other products in market sharing characteristics) using
aggregated quarterly scanner data for grocery yogurt product line sales in 178 DMAs from 2011Q1-2013Q4
(n = 262,297). 100 households simulated per DMA-period. Specification includes retailer, time, and
brand-DMA fixed effects. Standard errors reported below each estimate in parenthesis.
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Table 1.3: Counterfactual Simulation Results
(1) (2) (3)
Upstream Merger
∆ Surplus ($ million) No Store Brand Store Brand No Store Brand
∆ Manufacturer Profits
Merging manufacturers 111.58 24.87 140.92
Non-merging manufacturers 39.84 15.44 64.59
All manufacturers 151.42 40.31 205.51
∆ Retailer Profits
No store brand usage retailers 3.64 -4.43 -1.07
Low store brand usage retailers -75.55 -49.02 -137.93
High store brand usage retailers -132.01 -40.06 -189.84
All retailers -203.91 -93.50 -328.84
∆ Consumer Surplus
All consumers -935.98 -391.32 -1,518.90
∆ Total Surplus -988.47 -444.51 -1,642.23
Note: Surplus measures based on simulated counterfactuals using demand parameter and marginal cost
estimates for retailer-product lines in 184 DMAs from 2011Q1–2013Q4. Upstream merger simulated
between the two largest manufacturers based on observed revenues during the sample period. High store
brand usage retailers are those with the proportion of store brand products lines greater than 12.5%, low
store brand usage greater than zero and less than or equal to 12.5%, and no store brand usage retailers
exhibit 0% store brands in a given retailer-DMA-quarter.
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∆ Retailer Profits
Note: Each dot represents changes in equilibrium welfare measures for a given vector of model parameters.
The x-axis represents the change in retailer profits when moving from the baseline scenario A1 to the
comparative scenario B. Positive x-values represent an increase in profits for the retailer in moving from
the baseline to comparative scenario. Total surplus is plotted on the y-axis. Positive y-values represent
increasing total surplus when moving from the baseline to comparative scenario. Parameter values:
α = −5, cj = 0, γ = 0.1, ωj = 0 and (β, xj , ξj) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 1.5, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}, ∀j = 1, 2, 3. Equilibria
associated with duplicative vectors with variation only in parameters pertaining to product j = 2, which do
not impact the comparative static exercise between Scenarios A1 and B, are removed for visual clarity.
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Note: Each dot represents changes in equilibrium welfare measures for a given vector of model parameters.
The x-axis represents the change in retailer profits when moving from the baseline scenario A2 to the
comparative scenario B. Positive x-values represent an increase in profits for the retailer in moving from
the baseline to comparative scenario. Total surplus is plotted on the y-axis. Positive y-values represent
increasing total surplus when moving from the baseline to comparative scenario. Parameter values:
α = −5, cj = 0, γ = 0.1, ωj = 0 and (β, xj , ξj) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 1.5, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}, ∀j = 1, 2, 3.
Figure 1.3: Average Percentage Change in Retail Price of National Brand Product Lines
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Patent Licensing and Bias in Estimation and Prediction (with
Xuan Teng)
2.1 Introduction
In empirical analyses of markets using structural models of pricing competition, high prices
can be explained by high marginal costs, given market concentration and consumer pref-
erences. In this work, we examine a typically unobserved and commonly abstracted-away
market feature that additionally contributes to high prices: patent licensing relationships
between manufacturers.
Firms can exercise intellectual property rights by implementing technologies in produc-
ing goods and services and licensing these rights to other firms, including competitors. By
licensing, a firm can recoup private research and development costs, which can incentivize ex
ante innovation efforts, while publicly disseminating beneficial technologies in the market-
place. In many markets, firms license technologies to competitors1 in exchange for payments
that scale with the quantity sold of the competitors products that implement the licensed
technology.2 Under this payment structure, the incentives of the licensor and its competitors
1For example, in the cellphone market, Apple licenses scroll feature to IBM and Nokia. In the
electric vehicles market, Toyota licenses hybrid technology to Daimler (Mercedes Benz). In the tele-
visions market, the ATSC patent pool, whose licensors include Panasonic, LG and Samsung, li-
censes the package of essential patents to not only themselves but also competitors like Sharp (see:
https://www.mpegla.com/programs/atsc/licensors/).
2Royalty revenue may also be sales-based, i.e., rfQlpl We follow the theoretical papers in this literature
to focus on per-unit royalties (for example, see Reisinger and Tarantino (2019), Layne-Farrar and Lerner
(2010), Lerner and Tirole (2005)).
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become partially aligned: the licensor does not want to price cut their competitors too much,
so as to ensure fruitful royalty revenues. Because prices are strategic complements, the li-
censors’ competitors won’t charge low prices neither. Therefore, such alignment effects due
to the patent licensing relationships softens pricing competition, resulting in higher prices.
When estimating an empirical model of price competition, if a researcher observes who
licenses patents to whom at which royalty rates, the above alignment effect can be directly
accounted for and estimates of marginal costs can be accurately obtained. Unfortunately, the
terms and even the presence of intellectual licensing agreements are often kept confidential
between licensors and licensees and are not publicly observable. If a researcher proceeds to
estimate a supply model as if these agreements, and thus the associated alignment of incen-
tives, were not actually present, the resulting estimates will be biased in theory. Therefore,
unobserved patent licensing relationships introduce mis-specification errors into estimation
of marginal costs.
Further, the bias in the marginal cost estimates will propagate through any analysis of the
pricing competition, leading to biased predictions of counterfactual market outcomes. This
is because the bias in marginal cost estimates are generally not constant between status-
quo and counterfactual scenarios, and therefore cannot be cancelled out when evaluating
the effect of market structure changes. The changes in bias of marginal cost estimates
due to not accounting for licensing between status-quo and counterfactual scenarios root in
the magnitudes of the alignment effect. For example, how much a licensor cares about its
competitors product sales depends on the elasticity of its competitors product sales with
respect to its own price. If its competitors product sales are unaffected by its own price, the
licensor has no need to charge lower prices to secure royalty revenues. Since price elasticities
are market outcomes that depend on many aspects of the market structure, so does the
alignment effect. Moreover, the structural difference between pricing competition models
with and without patent licensing relationships naturally leads to different predictions of
market outcomes.
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The common existence in market analyses of counterfactual prediction bias due to unob-
served existing patent licensing relationships, along with the typical difficulty of collecting
patent licensing data, motivates us to ask and answer the following questions: Does the
unobserved licensing behavior always lead to positive or negative bias in marginal cost es-
timates and subsequently the evaluation of counterfactual scenarios? Under what market
conditions and which sorts of counterfactual structural changes would we larger prediction
biases? When would we expect opposite predicted changes of market outcomes from models
with and without patent licensing?
To answer these questions, we first explain the alignment effects and the resulting bias in
estimation and predictions in a theoretical framework. Then, we specify a model of pricing
competition with patent licensing relationships between competing manufacturers. We cali-
brate this model and conduct a series of simulation exercises to assess what features of a mar-
ket, including royalty rates, product substitution patterns, and market concentration, lead
to larger biases in estimation and counterfactual predictions when existing patent licensing
relationships are unobserved and assumed-away. We consider two types of counterfactuals:
a merger between licensor and licensee and a merger between licensees. This enables us to
examine which type of counterfactuals are likely to have larger prediction biases. We use
two sets of simulation exercises for two complementary purposes: theoretical simulations for
examining how biases change with respect to underlying primitives and guidance simulations
for showing, for what types of markets and their respective market characteristics would an
analyst be most concerned with biases due to unobserved patent licensing.
We find that estimation bias in marginal costs are increasing with royalty rates and the
sum of diversion ratios between licensor and licensees. The guidance simulations show that
such bias is typically not ignorable: in a sample of reasonably generated markets, the median
estimation bias is 28% of the true marginal cost. We show an alarming finding to researchers:
not accounting for existing patent licensing relationships can lead to opposite prediction of
merger effects. Such opposite predictions show up in both theoretical simulations and guid-
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ance simulations for both licensor-licensee mergers and licensee-licensee mergers. Because the
guidance simulations cover a richer set of markets (including asymmetric markets) compared
to the theoretical simulations that are based on a symmetric benchmark market, opposite
predictions show up more frequently in guidance simulations. In particular, in the theoretical
simulations, we find 4.3% to 4.4% of cases where the merger effects on prices predicted from
a mis-specified model not accounting for existing patent licensing relationships are opposite
to the true merger effects predicted from a true model accounting for existing patent licens-
ing relationships. In the guidance simulations, such fraction of opposite prediction cases
can be as high as 51.2%. Moreover, both sets of simulations find that, opposite predictions
happen when royalty rates are large. In particular, theoretical simulation finds that opposite
predictions happen when royalty rates account for about 80% of total marginal costs; while
guidance simulation finds that opposite predictions happen at high values of royalty rates
in the random sample of markets. We also detail the economic driving forces for opposite
predictions in each type of mergers. In licensor-licensee mergers, we find that the ignored
saving of royalty payment due to licensor-licensee merger leads to a decrease in prices and an
increase of consumer welfare after merger, which causes opposite predictions if one assumes
away the patent licensing relationships. In licensee-licensee mergers, we find that ignored de-
crease in alignment effect due to licensee-licensee merger leads to decrease of licensor’s price,
which causes opposite predictions if one assumes away the patent licensing relationships.
We argue that these two ignored channels when assuming away existing patent licensing
relationships are also driving forces for overall prediction biases that are unconditional on
opposite predictions.
In both sets of simulations and both types of mergers, we find that market-level merger
effects are over-predicted when one assumes away existing patent licensing relationships. We
further find that, the prediction biases are smaller in licensee-licensee merger than those in
licensor-licensee merger. In particular, the guidance simulation finds that, in licensor-licensee
mergers, assuming away existing patent licensing relationships lead to over-predicted increase
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of share-weighted average price by 2.6% at median, and over-predicted decrease of consumer
welfare by 9.3% at median; in licensee-licensee mergers, the two median predictions biases
are 0.5% and 1.4% respectively.
We also examine the relationships between prediction biases, royalty rates and sum of
diversion ratios between licensor and licensees. Theoretical simulation shows that prediction
biases increase with royalty rates; while guidance simulation also shows positive correlations
between the two. On the other hand, theoretical simulation shows non-monotonic relation-
ship between prediction biases and the sum of diversion ratios; while guidance simulation
finds that the potentials for prediction biases (i.e. maximum prediction biases) are positively
correlated with the sum of diversion ratios.
This chapter is related to three strands of the literature. First, we build on the literature
studying the role of intellectual property licensing on competition (Reisinger and Tarantino
(2019), Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2010), and Lerner and Tirole (2005)). Second, we apply
methods from the literature that uses theoretical and Monte Carlo simulations of structural
models to evaluate the implications of modeling techniques, merger diagnostic tools, and
different market features (Mazzeo, Seim, Varela (2018), Sheu and Taragin (2020), Balan
and Brand (2018), Miller, Remer, Ryan, and Sheu (2012, 2013, 2016, and 2017), Miller and
Podwol (2017), Dutra and Sabarwal (2020), Crooke (1999), Domnenko and Sibley (2020),
Das Varma and De Stefano (2020)). Finally, we contributes to the long literature in indus-
trial organization of estimating parameters in product competition models and predicting
counterfactual market outcomes (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), and Fan
and Yang (2020)). Our contribution lies in examining the consequences of not accounting for
existing patent licensing relationship into the pricing competition models and even general
supply-side models.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: section 2.2 illustrates the theoretical
framework to analyze estimation bias and prediction bias due to unobserved existing patent
licensing relationships; section 2.3 describes the simulation methods; section 2.4 shows sim-
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ulation results; section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Alignment Effects on Pricing and Estimation
We begin with explaining the alignment effect on pricing of patent licensing relationships
between manufacturers in a Bertrand-pricing competition framework. A set of multiple-
product firms compete in one market. Some of the firms are licensors, who license patents
to other firms and collect royalty revenues. Some of the firms are licensees, who purchase
licenses to legally use the patented technology in production, and pay royalties. Assume
that a licensor-manufacturer, f , produces and sells a set of products, Jf , and owns a single









where cj is product j’s total marginal costs, Qj is product j’s unit sales, Ef is the set
of other firms’ products that use firm f ’s patented technology, and rf is the exogenous per-
unit royalty rate charged by firm f . The patent licensing relationship described by rf and
Ef partially aligns firms’ pricing incentives: firm f ’s profit contains royalty payments that
depend on other firms’ sales, Ql.
Now, we extend the profit function in Equation 2.1 to nest the profit functions for licensee-
manufacturers. When rf = 0 and Ef is empty, it is as if the firm f is a licensee. Moreover,
we allow the total marginal cost, cj, to contain royalty rates whenever necessary. Therefore,
cj ≥ rf when j is a licensee-product. Under the assumption of Bertrand competition, profit-
3The model can be easily extended to allow multiple-patents licensor-manufacturers. We focus on single-
patent firm for simple exposition.
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maximizing prices are characterized by the following first-order conditions4:



















. We call µj as the alignment effect of the existing patent
licensing relationship on the price of product j. We note that µj is always non-negative, and
in particular always positive for licensors whose rf > 0.
5 Therefore, with patent licensing
relationships, the licensor has incentive to charge higher prices compared to the case without
patent licensing relationships. Because prices are strategic complements, the other firms are
incentivized to charge higher prices in response. We also note that Equation 2.2 nests the
case of no patent licensing relationships by setting rf = 0 for all f .
Now we consider how the lack of patent licensing data leads to estimation bias. Without
patent licensing data, the royalty rates, rf , the licensed products, Ef , and even the identity
of the licensor, f , are unobserved. Therefore, µj is unobserved. In such cases, µj is typically
assumed away, which results in the following commonly used back-out equation for marginal
cost:










where the prices are from the data and derivatives are from a correctly specified and
unbiased demand model estimation. Comparing Equation 2.3 to Equation 2.2, the resulting
bias in marginal cost estimation is driven by the alignment effect µj:
6
∆cj := c̃j − cj ≈ µj.
4We think that the existence and uniqueness of the above game does not trivially follow the same argument
for Nash-Bertrand pricing game without patent licensing relationships (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), Vives
(2001), and Aksoy-Pierson, Allon, and Federguen (2013)). This is mainly because the licensor-manufacturer
does not directly choose the price of licensee-manufacturers’ products.
5We assume that products are substitutes. Complement goods are beyond the scope of this work.
6We note that Equation 2.2 is one equation among a system of equations to back out the vector of
marginal costs of firm f . Therefore, the estimation bias is not exactly µj .
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Because µj is always positive, the unobserved alignment effects are likely to result in over-
estimated marginal costs. In fact, we note that, for a single-product licensor-manufacturer,
∆cj = µj > 0. Positive estimation bias in marginal costs is intuitive: the licensing relation-
ships create incentives for firms to charge higher prices, which will be explained by higher
marginal costs without licensing data. We note that µj = 0 for licensees’ products. In fact,
comparing Equation 2.3 to Equation 2.2 for licensee-manufacturers’ products whose rf = 0,
the two equations are exactly the same. This implies that licensee’s marginal costs are esti-
mated unbiasedly, even when the model ignores the existing patent licensing relationships.
Therefore, we focus on estimation bias in the marginal costs of the licensor.
2.2.2 Bias in Counterfactual Predictions
While the bias in estimated marginal costs of single-product firms has a clear sign, the
bias in counterfactual predictions does not. We start with counterfactual prices of licensor-
manufacturers. There two offsetting effects. First, overestimated marginal costs lead to
higher predicted prices. Second, not accounting for the alignment effects lead to lower pre-
dicted prices. The net effect on price prediction is determined by the relative importance of
the two channels. Since the bias in predicted counterfactual prices is ambiguous, the predic-
tion errors of counterfactual quantities, consumer welfare and profits are also ambiguous.
To formulate the idea, we define the price of a product owned by a licensor-manufacturer
that is predicted without licensing data, p̃′j, as solution to a mis-specified model: Equation2.2
with rf = 0 for all firms, status-quo biased marginal costs c̃j and counterfactual market
structures. And we define the price of the same product that is predicted with licensing
data, p′j, as solution to a true model: Equation 2.2 with observed rf and Ef , unbiased
marginal costs cj and the same counterfactual market structures. Now, we consider the
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difference between p̃′j and p
′
j, which is characterized by the following equation:
∆p′j := p̃
′
j − p′j = ∆cj︸︷︷︸
≈µj




































. In this chapter, we do not consider counter-
factual scenarios where the licensor-manufacturer’s marginal costs are changed. We note
that ∆p′j is determined by three terms: i) estimation bias ∆cj that is likely to be positive; ii)
difference between the predicted ”mark-ups” if there were no patent licensing relationships
(ṽ′j − v′j); iii) negative of counterfactual alignment effect, which is negative. While the sec-
ond term does not have a clear sign, the first and the third terms are offsetting each other.
Therefore, ∆p′j has an unclear sign.
In general, the alignment effect µj itself will change in counterfactual scenarios. This is
mainly because diversion ratios(− ∂Ql/∂pj
∂Qj/∂pj
) are sensitive to changes of prices and quantities,
which are typically changed in the counterfactuals. We focus on mergers among various
counterfactual scenarios, because merger is an important studied object in the literature
of industrial organization. We consider two types of mergers: licensor-licensee merger and
licensee-licensee merger.
The mis-specified model described in Equation 2.3 and the true model described in Equa-
tion 2.2 are different in three ways when predicting the effects of horizontal mergers. Firstly,
they have different estimated marginal costs as illustrated in section 2.1. Secondly, the mis-
specified model ignores a channel of cost saving after licensor-licensee mergers: the merged
licensee can save the royalty payment to the licensor after a merger with the licensor. Thirdly,
the mis-specified model ignores the royalty revenues as a part of the licensor’s pricing incen-
tive, both before and after the merger. This structural difference directly causes difference
between the predicted prices from the mis-specified model and the true model. Moreover,
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the mis-specified model has different inferred pre-merger profits than the true model. In
particular, the mis-specified model infer firms’ profits as if rf = 0 for all firms in Equation
2.1. We incorporate all these differences during simulations.
Given the same counterfactual, different market structures can lead to different changes
of the alignment effect and thus different prediction biases. We note that the magnitude of
the alignment effect, µj, is determined by two variables: i) the royalty rates (rf ), ii) the sum





). We will examine how
the biases in marginal cost estimations and merger effect predictions change with respect to
the two market characteristics.
2.3 Simulations Methods
2.3.1 The Model and Specification
We simulate a model of three single-product firms, A, B and C. A is a licensor-manufacturer,
B and C are licensee-manufacturers.
Demand. We follow the demand model in Mazzeo, Seim, and Varela (2018) to allow
flexible substitution patterns between ”horizontally” equidistant products. A consumer n
receives the following utility from choosing product j
ujn = θjn − αpj + εjn (2.5)
and utility u0n = ε0n from not purchasing. Here, α is the consumer’s price coefficient and
(θjn, εjn) are two idiosyncratic taste shocks. We assume εjn follows i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme
Value (T1EV) distribution with scale parameter σε. θjn is draw from a multivariate normal
distribution that allows for correlated shocks across products and non-zero means: θn ≡
(θ1n, θ2n, · · · , θJn)T ∼ N (θ|δ,Σ)7. The variance-covariance matrix Σ captures horizontally
7As noted by Mazzeo, Seim, and Varela (2018), θjn is comparable to a linear function of observed
product characteristics and random taste shocks: xjβn+ξjn where (βn, ξjn) are random variables distributed
according to some parameterized distribution. We also note that, when products are symmetric, such
specification can nests consumer-invariant quality shocks, ξj , with ρ = 1. When we simulate asymmetric
markets, we set σ = 0 and ρ = 0.
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We follow Mazzeo, Seim, and Varela (2018) to call ρ as the travel parameter, which
captures the distance between products in the preference space, with preferences for close
products being highly correlated. We note that ρ is one of the model primitives that deter-
mine the diversion ratios.















where J = {A,B,C} is the set of products. We normalize market size to 1. This
normalization is without loss of generality because market size is cancelled out everywhere
in the first-order condition Equation2.2.
Pricing Game. We maintain the Nash-Bertrand Pricing competition assumption. De-
note r as the royalty rate charged by firm A. We allow the licensees to have the same
marginal costs as the licensor, as long as the licensees’ marginal costs are no smaller than
the royalty rate: cj ≥ r,∀j ∈ {B,C}. Applying the above set-up of three single-product firms
and patent licensing relationships to the first-order condition, Equation 2.2, the equilibrium
prices are characterized by the following equations:
















Qj, cj ≥ r,∀j ∈ {B,C}.
(2.8)
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We apply the measurement of the equivalent variation in McFadden (1973) to quantify














Merger Effects. We consider two types of merger: i) merger between the licensor,
A, and one of the licensees; ii) merger between the two licensees, B and C. We measure
merger effects on a market outcome y in percentage change before and after the merger:
%∆y := (y′− y)/y. We consider market outcomes (y) including prices, quantities, consumer
welfare and producer surplus. Lastly, we measure prediction bias of merger effects with
difference between the merger effects (%∆ỹ) predicted from the mis-specified model that
does not account for patent licensing relationships and biased marginal cost estimates and
the merger effects (%∆y) predicted from the true model that accounts for patent licensing
relationships and true marginal costs: denoted as ∆∆y := %∆ỹ −%∆y.
2.3.2 The Simulation Algorithm
We have two goals of simulation: i) examine the theoretical ambiguity between model primi-
tives and the biases in estimation and prediction; ii) provide guidance on correlations between
typically observed market structures and the biases in estimation and prediction. For these
two different goals, we design two different simulation algorithms. For the first goal of the-
oretical relationships, the designed simulation algorithm changes one model primitive over
a continuum of values, holding all the other primitives fixed at a benchmark level. We call
this set of simulations as theoretical simulation. For the second goal of guidance, the de-
signed simulation algorithm randomly draws a rich set of various markets, backs out model
primitives from the drawn market outcomes, then simulates the biases in estimation and pre-
dictions in each market. We call this set of simulations as guidance simulation. We explain
the details of each simulation algorithm as below.
Theoretical Simulation. In the theoretical simulation, we specify a benchmark mar-
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ket, and then change one single model primitive in each simulation, holding all other model
primitives fixed at the benchmark value. The benchmark market is summarized in Table
2.1. In the benchmark market, we shut down all random coefficients by setting σ and ρ
to be zero. Then, the demand model in Equation 2.7 is reduced to a logit-demand model.
Next, we set the scale parameter of the logit error, σε, to be 0.1, so that changes in demand
parameters have more bites on quantities. Also, we shut down patent licensing relationship
in the benchmark market, by setting royalty rate, r, to be zero. We normalize market size,
M , to be 1. Lastly, we set the benchmark market as a symmetric one: all products have the
same marginal cost value, c, equal to 1; market share of each product is 25%; own price elas-
ticity of demand of each product is -2.5. Based on such a set of model primitives and market
outcomes, we back out the value of the common mean utilities (δ) of the three symmetric
products; the value of the price coefficient (α); and calculate the price that are consistent
with the market shares and price elasticities.
In theoretical simulations, we set σ = 1, σε = 0.1
8. We simulate biases in estimation and
predictions with respect to different values of royalty rate (r) within [0, 1] and the travel
parameter (ρ) within [0, 1]. The simulation step is 0.01 for each parameter. To be aligned
with the literature, we report the bias with respect to the resulting sum of diversion ratios







9. Holding all the other
model primitives fixed at the benchmark value in Table 2.1, for each pair of (r, ρ), we take
the following steps to simulate the biases:
1. Simulate the pricing game described in Equation 2.8, which accounts for existing patent
licensing relationships.
2. Back out the mis-specified marginal costs, c̃j, as described in Equation 2.3. Calculate
8We follow Mazzeo, Seim, and Varela (2018) to set σε = 0.1 so that variation in horizontal differentiation,
i.e., in the travel parameter ρ, may have a large impact on market outcomes.
9In the Appendix Figure B.1 we show that the travel parameter ρ determines the sum of diversion ratios
between licensor and licensees.
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the estimation bias, ∆cj := c̃j − cj.
3. Simulate post-merger equilibrium with biased marginal costs, c̃j, and the mis-specified
model where r = 0 in Equation 2.8 with r = 0. Predict biased merger effects. In
licensor-licensee mergers, we merge firm A and firm B10. We note that, in the mis-
specified model, product B’s total marginal cost is not changed after the merger, since
r is unobserved and assumed away. In licensee-licensee mergers, we merger firm B and
firm C.
4. Merger simulation with true marginal costs, cj, and the true model as described in 2.8.
Predict true merger effects. We note that, in the true model, after the licensor-licensee
merger, product B’s total marginal cost is decreased by r.
5. Compute the prediction bias in merger effects: ∆∆y = %∆ỹ−%∆y, i.e. the difference
between predicted percentage changes in the market outcome y after the merger from
the mis-specified model and the true model.
Guidance Simulation. In guidance simulation, we set σ = 0, σε = 1. We generate
and analyze a given theoretical market by the procedure outlined below. To construct our
sample of markets, we repeat this process sufficiently as to generate 1,000 markets. For each
market, we normalize initial prices, p0j = 1 for j = 1, ..., |J |, where |J | is the number of
single-product firms in the market.
1. Obtain market shares by first drawing random variables šj ∼ U [0, 1] for j = A,B,C.
Calculate firm j’s market share by, sj = (1−s0) šj∑
j′=A,B,C šj′
, where s0 = 0.25 represents
the initial share of the outside good. Back out mean utilities, δj = log(sj)− log(s0).
2. Draw the licensor’s product margins as, mA ∼ U [0.25, 0.75].
3. Draw the royalty rate uniformly as, r ∼ U [0,mA].11
10Because the two licensees are symmetric during the simulation, mergers between firm A and firm B are
the equivalent to mergers between the licensor, A, and licensee C.
11Setting the upper bound of the support on r to m1 ensures the model is well-defined, specifically, that
α < 0.
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4. From the licensor’s first order condition taking into account the licensing relationship,
back out the price sensitivity parameter as,
α =
−1













for j = B,C (2.11)
6. Determine implied “true” costs for licensor and licensees as,12
cj = pj(1−mj) for j = A,B,C (2.12)
7. Given prices, p, using first order conditions that do not account for the licensing rela-
tionships back out the mis-specified marginal costs, c̃j, as in Equation (2.3).
8. Conduct counterfactual simulation with the mis-specified model and c̃j.
9. Conduct counterfactual simulation with the true model and true cj.
10. Compute the prediction bias in merger effects, ∆∆y.
11. Repeat Steps 1–10 until a total of 1,000 sample markets are obtained.
Guidance Simulation Sample. In order to understand the scope of markets com-
prising the sample generated from the above outlined procedure, we detail the key market
characteristics in the sample. Table 2.2 documents the empirical distributions of these market
characteristics for the generated sample. While royalty rates, r, and the licensor’s margin,
mA, are drawn uniformly (see Guidance Simulation Section), we drop markets for which
model primitives imply negative costs, inducing a non-uniform observed distribution in the
12 Markets with any negative costs (i.e., cj < 0 for any j) are discarded. This can occur when r is large.
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sample over these primitives. Under Nash-Bertrand competition with a logit demand system,
the licensees’ costs are decreasing in both royalty rates and the licensor’s margin. Thus, each
respective empirical distribution is shifted left relative to parameter’s drawn upon uniform
distribution. For example, royalty rates are drawn uniformly from zero to one, however the
empirical distribution of markets with non-negative implied costs is centered around 0.225
with a right tail. Similarly, the empirical distribution of the licensor margin is slightly left-
shifted relative to the uniform distribution over [0.25, 0.75], from which this parameter is
initially drawn.
The resulting sample exhibits variation in concentration, as quantified by market shares
and HHI, margins, costs, and market elasticity. Note that prices deviate from the initially
normalized prices due to resolving the pricing game upon recovering costs, and the price
sensitivity parameter, α (see Step 7) and exhibit some heterogeneity, particularly for the
licensor. However, margins, both the drawn licensor margin, mA, and the implied licensee
margins, mB and mC , exhibit larger variation than prices, mechanically giving rise to het-
erogeneity in costs. Additionally, looking ahead to the counterfactuals that we will evaluate
under this framework – a merger between licensor and licensee (i.e., AB) and a merger
between the two licensors (i.e., BC) – the resulting changes in market concentration vary
substantially.
2.4 Simulation Results
2.4.1 The Simulated Bias in Marginal Cost Estimation
Theoretical Simulation Results. Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical simulation results on
marginal cost estimation bias in a heat-map. The horizontal axis is the sum of diversion ratios








axis is the royalty rate r charged by the licensor, and also the fraction of r over product-level
total marginal cost, since total marginal costs are normalized to 1. The color shows the exact
value of the estimation bias in marginal costs of the licensor, ∆cA := (c̃A − cA)/cA. It is not
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surprising that the features of ∆cA are consistent with the features of the alignment effect,
because in the pre-merger market, the licensor is a single-product firm, the estimation bias is
equal to the alignment effect. In particular, consistent with the fact that the alignment effect
is always non-negative, the estimation bias in the licensor’s marginal costs is always positive.
This implies that ignoring existing patent licensing relationships will lead to over-estimated
marginal costs of the licensor. Moreover, consistent with the increasing monotonicity of the
alignment effect with respect to royalty rates and the sum of diversion ratios between the
licensor and the licensees, the estimation bias is also increasing with respect to these two
model features. The average bias in estimated marginal costs from the mis-specified model
is 25.28% of the true marginal costs. 13
Guidance Simulation Results. As described in Step 8 of the Guidance/Monte Carlo
Simulation Procedure, costs are backed out for the mis-specified model for each firm. We
compare these costs, c̃, to the true costs implied by a model correctly accounting for the
licensing relationships between firms. Given licensee first order conditions are identical
between true and mis-specified models (see Equation 2.8), the implied licensee costs are
the same between the two models, i.e., cj = c̃j for j = B, C. However, for the licensor,
the alignment effect term, µA, is not accounted for in the mis-specified model, and thus
implied licensor costs diverge between the two models. Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2 show the
distribution of the bias in estimation of licensor marginal costs from the simulation sample.
In all simulated markets, licensor marginal costs are overestimated in the mis-specified model
relative to those consistent with the true model.
As detailed in Table 2.3, estimates of the licensor’s costs under a mis-specified model can
lead to significant differences from the true costs. At the median, estimates of the licensor’s
costs under the mis-specified model differ by 28% from those implied by the true model.
Even at the 5th percentile, costs estimates differ by a non-negligible amount (i.e., 2.5%).
13We report estimation bias of licensee’s marginal costs in Appendix Figures B.4 and B.5. Consistent with
the theoretical framework, the bias are extremely small, and there is no pattern with respect to royalty rates
and diversion ratios. Thus, we interpret these ”estimation bias” as computation errors.
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In order to understand when we would expect this bias in cost estimation to be larger
in real world markets, we can assess how the bias varies by underlying model primitives –
specifically, the licensing royalty rate, r, and the sum of the diversion ratios between the
licensor and each respective licensee. Given the assumed exogeneity of the royalty rate,
r, from Equation 2.8, we would expect size of the cost estimation bias to scale with the
royalty rate. Indeed, in Figure 2.4, we see that, for a given sum of diversion ratios between
the licensor and each respective licensee, the greater the royalty rate, the larger the bias in
estimation of licensor costs.14
Given this set of guidance simulations is aimed at understanding in what real world
markets would we expect larger differences between the estimates of a mis-specified model
and the true model, we analyze these cost estimates relative to a common measure of market
concentration – HHI. In Figure 2.3, we see that in less concentrated markets (i.e., smaller
HHI), there is larger variance in the percentage difference in estimated licensor marginal
costs between mis-specified and true models. While in more concentrated markets, there
is smaller variance in cost estimate differences, the magnitude is still relatively large. For
example, on the right-hand side of Figure 2.3, one relatively concentrated simulated market is
observed with a pre-merger HHI of 4523 while exhibiting a relatively large estimated licensor
cost difference of 50.62%.
Understanding that, in these simulated markets, implied licensor costs can be significantly
overestimated in a model that does not account for licensing, in Section 2.4.2 below, we look
to understand the implications of this overestimation on counterfactual equilibrium objects
of interest to researchers, policy makers, and antitrust authorities.
2.4.2 Prediction Bias in Licensor-Licensee Mergers
Theoretical Simulation Results. Figures 2.5 to 2.8 shows the results on the prediction
biases in the effects of mergers between the licensor, A, and licensee B. The horizontal axis
14This correlation between royalty rate levels and the bias in licensor cost estimation is additionally
demonstrated in Appendix Figure B.6 where cost biases are plotted against royalty rates.
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is the sum of the diversion ratios between the licensor A and the two licensees. The vertical
axis is the royalty rate r. The colors show the prediction biases. Figure 2.5 shows the
prediction biases in consumer welfare effects of the mergers. Figure 2.6 shows the prediction
biases in the merger effects on sales-weighted average price. Figure 2.7 shows the prediction
biases in the merger effects on total quantities. Figure 2.8 shows the prediction biases in the
merger effects on producer surplus.
Overall, the results in Figures 2.5 to 2.8 show that i) the higher the royalty rates, the
larger the magnitude of the prediction bias, and ii) the relationship between diversion ratios
and the prediction bias is non-monotonic. Given a level of the sum of diversion ratios,
figure 2.5 shows that the magnitude of the prediction bias in the consumer welfare effects
of the merger increases with royalty rate. Similar patterns exist for Figures 2.6, 2.7, and
2.8, including merger effects on sales-weighted average price, total quantities and producer
surplus. Given a royalty rate, Figure 2.8 shows that the prediction bias on the merger effects
on producer surplus increases with the sum of diversion ratios. However, Figure 2.5 shows
that, given a low level of royalty rate, the magnitude of the prediction bias in the consumer
welfare effects typically decrease as the sum of diversion ratios increases. But at high levels
of royalty rates, such as 80% of the licensees’ marginal costs, the prediction bias might reach
the largest magnitude when the sum of diversion ratios is at middle range such as 0.5. Similar
patterns show up in the Figure 2.7. Figure 2.6 shows an even more obvious non-monotonic
relationship between the prediction bias and the sum of diversion ratios, when it comes to
the prediction of merger effects on sales-weighted average price. In particular, given a level
of royalty rate, the prediction bias in Figure 2.6 firstly increases then decreases as the sum
of diversion ratios increases.
The above results have two implications. First, when predicting merger effects on con-
sumer surplus, sales-weighted average price and total quantities, it’s better to be careful if
the royalty rates are high and diversion ratios are in the middle range. Second, estimation
bias in marginal costs is not the deterministic factor for prediction biases. As estimation bias
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in marginal costs always increase with the sum of diversion ratios as shown in Figure 2.1,
we see non-monotonic relationship between the prediction biases and the sum of diversion
ratios. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis of ∆pj′ in Equation 2.4.
Table 2.4 provides summary statistics of the theoretical simulation results on the pre-
diction bias, conditional on positive royalty rates. Each row is a market outcome of general
interests. The first column reports the average prediction bias. The second column reports
the average true merger effects, measured in the percentage change of a market outcome
relative to its pre-merger levels. The third column reports the percentage of cases that gen-
erate over-predicted merger effects in magnitudes during the simulation. Recall that each
case is a pair of royalty rates and the travel parameter, i.e. (r, ρ). The last column reports
the percentage of cases where the mis-specified model predicts opposite direction of merger
effects during the simulation. The results are conditional on positive royalty rates, so that
ignoring patent licensing relationship or not is non-trivial.
Column (2) of Table 2.4 shows that the simulated merger effects are economically rea-
sonable. On average, the true model with patent licensing relationships predicts decrease in
consumer surplus, increase in all prices, decrease in the quantities of the merged products
and increase in the quantity of the non-merging product, and increase in all profits after the
licensor-licensee merger.
At market level, Column (1) of Table 2.4 shows that, on average, the mis-specified model
predicts more loss in consumer welfare by 2.4%, more increase in sales-weighted average
price by 2.7%, more decrease in total quantities by 1.8% and more increase in producer
surplus by 2.8% after the licensor-licensee merger. At product level, Column(1) of Table
2.4 shows that, the market-level overly predicted post-merger price increase is driven by the
overly predicted post-merger price increase of the merged licensee’s product, B. As prices are
strategic complements, it’s not surprising to see that post-merger prices of the licensor’s good,
A, and the non-merging licensee’s good, C, are also overly predicted by the mis-specified
model. The largely over-predicted post-merger price B also leads to largely over-predicted
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post-merger decrease in quantity B, which leads to the overall over-predicted post-merger
decrease in quantities at the market level15. At product-level, we see over-predicted post-
merger profit increase as what we see at market-level. These results are consistent with
column (3) of Table 2.4, which shows that in almost all of the cases, merger effects are
over-predicted in the mis-specified model16.
The last column of Table 2.4 shows the existence of opposite prediction when the pre-
diction is based on mis-specified model ignoring existing patent licensing relationship. This
is alarming to researchers. It shows 3% of simulation cases see opposite predictions on
merger effect on sales-weighted average price. It further shows that the opposite predic-
tion in market-level average price roots in opposite prediction in price B; and the opposite
prediction in price B also leads to opposite prediction in Quantity B.
We provide more details on the opposition predictions in Table 2.5. Column (1) shows
the average royalty rates where the opposition prediction on each market outcome happens.
Column (2) shows the corresponding average sum of diversion ratios. Column (3) shows the
corresponding average travel parameter. Column (4) shows the corresponding average true
merger effects. Column (5) shows the corresponding average mis-specified merger effects.
Column (6) shows the corresponding average prediction bias.
To answer where the opposite predictions happen, Column (1) of Table 2.5 shows that, the
opposite prediction cases mainly happen in relatively extreme cases: royalty rates accounts
for more than 85% of total marginal costs. This is good news. Column(2) and (3) show
15As for the other merged product, A, while its post-merger price are over predicted (i.e. higher post-
merger price A), it’s quantity decrease is not over predicted and practically always under-predicted. This
might be due to the relative over predictions in prices of A, B and C. Note that price of B is the most
over-predicted price. Therefore, good A will be predicted more attractive to consumers than good B in the
mis-specified model, which leads to the less decrease in quantity A. Similar reasons explain why the non-
merging product, C, also see over-predicted post-merger price increase, and higher post-merger downloads
predicted from the mis-specified model.
16We additionally note that, given no opposite prediction on the merger effects on price of A, pA, over-
prediction is the same as ∆p′A > 0. Therefore, the 98.8% of over-prediction cases imply that in most of the
cases, the ignored alignment effect in Equation 2.4 is not driving the prediction biases in post-merger price of
the licensor-manufacturer. However, given the averagely negative true merger effect and positive prediction
bias on quantity of A, Q̃′A > Q
′




A. Therefore, both the first and the second terms in
Equation 2.4 are positive, which disenables us to conclude that marginal cost estimation bias is driving the
prediction bias.
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that, to have opposite predictions on market-level sales-weighted average price, we also need
extremely high substitutability between products. However, only middle substitutability
between products are needed to generate opposite predictions on product-level price and
quantity, conditional on extremely high royalty rates.
To answer how the opposite prediction happens, column(4) and (5) of Table 2.5 shows
that the reason is that the mis-specified model ignores cost-saving of product B after its
merger with the licensor. In particular, column (4) shows that the opposite prediction of
the merger effect on sales-weighted average price happens because the true merger effects
actually lead to decrease in the sales-weighted average price by 0.16% on average. Such lower
price after merger happens because the merged licensee, B, does not need to pay royalty rates
to the licensor, A, after the merger. With the cost saving, product B can enjoy a 0.78%
lower price on average. However, column (5) shows that, the mis-specified model cannot
account for such cost reduction channels, and thus, predicts that the price of product B will
increase by 10.8% after the merger, on average. Such discrepancy in predicted post-merger
price of B also leads to opposite predictions on post-merger quantities of B between the true
model and the mis-specified model: on average, the true model predicts 2.7% increase of the
quantity of product B, while the mis-specified model predicts 10.3% decrease of the quantity
of product B. Now, the close relationship between the opposite prediction and high royalty
rates are intuitive: a higher royalty rate implies larger cost reduction un-captured by the
mis-specified model.
To answer how important are those opposite-prediction cases, we compare column (4) to
(6) in Table 2.5 to column (1) and (2) in Table 2.4. Comparing column (1) of Table 2.4 to
column (6) of Table 2.5, it shows that in the cases of opposite predictions, the prediction
bias are larger in magnitudes. Comparing column (2) of Table 2.4 to column (4) of Table
2.5, it shows that in the cases of opposite predictions, the true merger effects are smaller
in magnitudes. More importantly, we note that the average prediction bias on price of B
is 11.61% conditional on opposite predictions, while the unconditional average prediction
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bias is 6.23% as reported in Table 2.4. Since the average prediction bias of merger effects
on price B is driving the market-level prediction biases on prices, we conclude that the
ignored royalty payment saving due to licensor-licensee merger is driving the prediction bias
in licensor-licensee merger.
Guidance Simulation Results. We can analyze the bias in counterfactual predictions
between the true and mis-specified models under a horizontal merger between the licensor
(j = A) and one of the licensees (without loss, j = B). From these simulations, we find that,
in general, due to the overestimation of licensor costs from not accounting for the licensing
relationship, as detailed above in Section 2.4.1, the mis-specified model predicts inflated
counterfactual welfare measures. Particularly, relative to the true model, the mis-specified
model predicts larger welfare losses for consumers and greater welfare gains for producers
following a merger between the licensor and a licensee.
To assess for what characteristics of real-world markets we would expect to find larger
biases in counterfactual prediction, we compare the biases in counterfactual measures across
a rich set of simulated markets that span the space of reasonable underlying model primitives.
This allows examine where the bias in counterfactual predictions is largest, and thus cause for
concern for market analysts, across generated markets with different distributions of market
shares, margins, and royalty rates.
To explore when prediction biases are largest and provide guidance to analysts evalu-
ating markets with potentially unobserved licensing behavior, we plot the bias in a given
counterfactual measure derived for each market in our sample against the distribution of an
underlying model parameter.
First, we show how the bias in key counterfactual measures vary with the licensing royalty
rate, r. Figure 2.9 plots the relationship between a market’s royalty rate, r, and the bias
in reported counterfactual-factual change in share-weighted average prices between the mis-
specified and true model. Each circle represents a generated market with its associated
values plotted in r-p̄ space. It can be seen from the strictly positive biases (i.e., only positive
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values on the y-axis) that the mis-specified model exhaustively overestimates the percent
change in share-weighted average prices, relative to the true model (see also the top panel
of Table 2.6).17 Further, moving from left to right within Figure 2.9, we see that markets
that exhibit a larger royalty rate are correlated with a larger bias in predicted change in
share-weighted average price, with heterogeneity in the prediction bias at larger values of r.
Therefore, in real world markets, we would expect markets with larger royalty rates to have
the potential to exhibit larger errors in reported prices from a licensor-licensee merger under
a mis-specified model and thus more reason for concern for market analysts.
Given that mis-specified model exhaustively predicts a larger change in share-weighted
prices than the true model and that larger magnitudes of this overprediction (particularly
the maximum bias) are associated with royalty rates, we would expected the mis-specified
model to predict larger changes in the shares of the inside goods (i.e.,
∑
j=A,B,C sj) and that
the magnitude of this overprediction increases in r. Indeed, this relationship is exhibited in
Figure 2.10 – when royalty rates are larger, we see that the mis-specified model generally
predicts a larger decrease in total inside shares relative to the true model.18 Given the
overprediction of price increases and the associated overprediction of inside share decreases,
we would generally expect an overprediction of consumer welfare losses as the royalty rate
increases. In our sample, this relationship holds, as shown in Figure 2.11, which plots the
bias in predicted changes in consumer surplus between the mis-specified and true models
against a market’s royalty rate, r. Finally, predictions for change in producer profits due
to the licensor-licensee merger seem to follow a less clear trend, in terms of the correlation
with royalty rates, as exhibited in Figure 2.12, however are largely overpredicted. Overall,
these results with respect to the market’s royalty rate suggest that for markets with a larger
royalty rate, the analysis of a merger between the licensor and a licensee under a model that
17In all simulated markets, the mis-specified model predicts an increase in share-weighted average prices
due to the licensor-licensee merger, while the true model does so for only 63.7% of markets.
18The mis-specified model underpredicts post-merger shares for Firm B (i.e., the merging licensee), while
it overpredicts shares for Firm A (i.e., the merging licensor) and Firm C (i.e., the non-merging licensee). See
Table 2.6
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does not account for licensing behavior can critically overpredict pre- to post-merger changes
in key welfare measures.
We can additionally assess the mis-specified model’s counterfactual predictions in the
simulated markets based on the sum of the diversion ratios between the licensor and each
licensee. Figures 2.13 to 2.16 shows the relationship between the same biases in predicted
changes in welfare measures as Figures 2.9 to 2.12 – share-weighted average prices, total
inside market shares, consumer surplus, and producer surplus – now against the model’s im-
plied sum of diversion ratios between the licensor and the two respective licensees. The trend
in prediction bias is less clear, however we can observe that maximum (i.e., frontier) over-
or underprediction does exhibit an association with the sum of diversion ratios measure.19
For example, Figure 2.13 shows that, for larger sum of diversion ratios, the maximum over-
prediction of share-weighted average prices is generally increasing. Similarly, the maximum
overprediction in pre- to post-merger decreases in inside shares and the maximum overpre-
diction in pre- to post-merger decreases in consumer surplus are generally increasing in the
sum of the royalty rate. The relationship between the maximum prediction error in changes
in producer surplus is non-monotonic in the sum of diversion ratios. Specifically, at smaller
values of the sum of diversion ratios, the maximum prediction bias in producer surplus is
increasing; however, at larger values, this frontier is decreasing. For market analysts, this
non-monotonicity suggests concern for larger overpredictions in producer surplus lie in the
interior of feasible sum of diversion ratios, while larger prediction biases for share-weighted
average prices, total inside shares, and consumer surplus occur at high values of the sum of
diversion ratio term.
Not only are we interested where in the model primitive space do the magnitude of
predictions diverge between the mis-specified and true models, but also when they predict
changes in welfare measures of the opposite sign. If, for example, a mis-specified model is
used to evaluate a merger that (incorrectly) predicts losses in consumer surplus, whereas a
19Given the simulated outside market shares are calibrated at s0 = 0.25, the maximum possible sum of
diversion ratios is 1− s0 = 0.75.
59
correctly-specified model would predict consumer surplus gains, an analyst may critically
arrive at an opposite policy recommendation against allowing the merger occur. In Table
2.7, we summarize the predictions in welfare measures between the true and mis-specified
models across the generated sample of markets. In the top panel, first column, we see that,
on average, share-weighted prices increase by 2% following the merger between licensor (Firm
A) and licensee (Firm B). This increase in share-weighted average prices is larger driven by
increases in Firm A’s product, which is 9.9% higher than pre-merger levels, on average. The
mis-specified model overpredicts share-weighted average prices by 3.5% on average, largely
due the overprediction of post-merger price of Firm B (i.e., the merging licensee). This follows
from the intuition that Firm B, by merging with the licensor, no longer needs to pay the
royalty rate, which reflects a cost savings that induces downward pressure on Firm B’s post-
merger price. Given the mis-specified model does not account for the pre-merger licensing
relationship, no cost savings are exhibited and, thus, the mis-specified model overpredicts
Firm B’s price increase, on average by 8.9 percentage points.
In the generated sample, the true model predicts increase in share-weighted prices due to
the licensor-licensee merger 63.7% of the time, while the mis-specified model always predicts
higher post-merger prices. In the remaining 36.3% of sample markets, the true model predicts
a decrease in share-weighted average prices, with the mis-specified model predicting the
opposite effect in these markets, as shown in the third column of Table 2.7.
We see corresponding trends in the average effects, biases, and opposite predictions in
terms of market shares. The true model predicts, on average, a decrease in inside shares,
driven by large decreases Firm A’s market share. On average, the mis-specified model
overpredicts this decrease in total inside market shares by 4.7% and predicts an opposite
change in the inside total share in 32.7% of markets.
The true model that accounts for licensing predicts, on average, a 5.0% decrease in
consumer surplus due to the licensor-licensee merger. Largely driven by the inability to
account for the cost savings from the merging licensee, and the associated prediction of
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a higher post-merger price for Firm B, the mis-specified model overpredicts the loss in
consumer surplus by 15 percentage points. Critically, the true model predicts increases
in consumer surplus in 32.7% of markets, while the mis-specified model exclusively predicts
consumer surplus losses. In other words, the mis-specified model predicts an opposite effect
on consumer for approximately one third of markets in our simulated sample. Given modern
merger enforcement’s focus on consumer welfare to drive policy recommendations, in these
markets with opposite consumer surplus predictions, a mis-specified model that does not
take into account licensing behavior would lead to an errant recommendation.
What are the characteristics of the markets in which the true and mis-specified model
predict opposite effects? In Table 2.8, we detail the conditional distribution of market char-
acteristics for markets that exhibit opposite predictions between the true and mis-specified
model for at least one welfare measure (i.e., prices, shares, profits, or consumer surplus).
Relative to the full distribution of the sample given in Table 2.2, markets that exhibit an
opposite prediction in at least one welfare measures by the mis-specified model generally
exhibit: larger royalty rates, larger licensee shares and margins, higher concentration both
pre- and post-merger, larger costs, particularly for licensees, and more elastic demand.
2.4.3 Prediction Bias in Licensee-Licensee Mergers
Theoretical Simulation Results. Figures 2.17 to 2.20 shows the theoretical simulation
results on the prediction biases in the effect of merger between the two licensees, B and
C. Firstly, Figure 2.17, Figure 2.18 and Figure 2.19 show that i) the prediction biases in
the merger’s effect on consumer welfare, sales-weighted average prices and total quantities
increase with royalty rate; and ii) the prediction biases firstly increase then decrease with
the sum of diversion ratios in two rounds. Secondly, Figure 2.20 shows that the prediction
biases in the merger effects producer surplus increase with both royalty rate and the sum of
diversion ratios.
We interpret the above results with three implications similar to those from Figures
2.5 to 2.8. First, when a researcher predicts post-merger quantities and consumer surplus
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without data on existing patent licensing relationships, the researcher is better to be careful
if royalty rates are large and the diversion ratios are at middle range. Second, when a
researcher predicts post-merger prices and profits without data on existing patent licensing
relationships, the research is better to be careful if royalty rates and the sum of diversion
ratios are large 20. Third, estimation bias in marginal costs is not the deterministic factor
for prediction biases: As alignment effect always increase with the sum of diversion ratios,
we see up and downs in the prediction bias with respect to the sum of diversion ratios.
We summarize the prediction bias in Table 2.9, in the same format as Table 2.4. In
particular, each row is a market outcome of interests. Column (1) reports the average pre-
diction bias. Column (2) reports the average true merger effects. Column (3) reports the
percentage of cases that generate over-predicted merger effects in magnitudes during the
simulation. Column (4) reports the percentage of cases where the mis-specified model pre-
dicts opposite direction of merger effects during the simulation. The results are conditional
on positive royalty rates, so that ignoring patent licensing relationship or not is non-trivial.
Compared to the results in Table 2.4 for licensor-licensee merger, Table 2.9 shows that, for
licensee-licensee merger, prediction bias on market-level outcomes have the same signs and
smaller magnitudes; while prediction bias on product-level outcomes are quite different even
in signs. We firstly discuss each group of outcomes, then focus on the opposite prediction
cases.
With respect to licensee-licensee merger’s effect on consumer surplus, the first row of
Table 2.9 shows that, the average prediction bias is−0.2% with an average true merger effects
of −10.9%. This implies that the mis-specified model typically over-predict the decrease in
consumer surplus due to the licensee-licensee merger. This is also seen in the first row of
Table 2.4. The last two columns in the first-row shows that, in 99.9% cases during simulation,
20We note that non-monotonicity with respect to the sum of diversion ratios is more obvious in prediction
bias on post-merger quantities and consumer welfare than in prediction bias on post-merger prices. We
think the reason is that, apart from indirectly affecting the demand non-linearly through affecting prices
with alignment effects, the travel parameter (determinant of diversion ratios) directly affect demand through
consumer preferences.
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the mis-specified model predicts larger consumer welfare effect than the true model, and in
no case does the mis-specified model predict opposite consumer welfare effect compared to
the true model.
With respect to licensee-licensee merger’s effect on prices, the rows two to five of Table 2.9
show that, the average prediction biases and the average true merger effect on sales-weighted
average price and product-level prices are all positive. This implies that the mis-specified
model typically over-predicts the increase in prices due to the licensee-licensee merger, which
also happens in licensor-licensee merger as shown in Table 2.4. The high ratios of over-
prediction cases are consistent with this implication. Lastly, there are 4.4% cases where the
mis-specified model predicts opposite licensee-licensee merger effect on price of the licensor’s
product, A. We discuss the underlying reasoning later.
With respect to licensee-licensee merger’s effect on quantities, the rows six to nine of
Table 2.9 show that, the average prediction bias and the average true merger effect on total
quantities are negative. This implies that the mis-specified model typically over-predicts the
decrease in quantities due to the licensee-licensee merger, which also happens in licensor-
licensee merger as shown in Table 2.4. This implication is consistent with the 99.9% cases
that see over-predictions. At product-level, we see different merger effects and prediction
biases compared to Table 2.4. This is reasonable since the merged firms and different. In
particular, with the merged firms being the licensees, the licensor’s product, A, sees increase
in quantities due to the merger. Then, given the average negative prediction bias on merger
effect on quantity A (−0.69%), the result implies that the mis-specified model typically
under-predicts the increase in the non-merging firm’s quantity due to the licensee-licensee’s
merger. Notice that this is qualitatively different from the result in Table 2.4, where the
averagely positive effect on the non-merging firm’s quantity, C, is typically over-predicted.
We will explain this result together with the opposite predictions on merger effect on price
A later. As for merged firms’ quantities, Table 2.9 shows that, the licensee-licensee merger
averagely leads to decrease in merged firms’ quantities (by 15.0% to 15.6%), and the mis-
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specified model averagely weakly under-predicts the decrease their quantities. This result is
consistent with the close-to-zero ratio of over-prediction21. There is no opposite-prediction
case with respect to quantity effects of the licensee-licensee merger.
With respect to licensee-licensee merger’s effect on profits, the last three rows of Table
2.9 shows that, the mis-specified model averagely over-predicts the increase in firms’ profits
due to the licensee-licensee merger. This is consistent with the high ratio of over-prediction
cases. Lastly, given the opposite prediction on price effects on product A, there also exists
opposite prediction on profit effects on product A.
We summarize the opposite-prediction cases in Table 2.10, in the similar format as Table
2.5. In particular, Column (1) shows the average royalty rates where the opposite prediction
on each market outcome happens. Column (2) shows the corresponding average sum of
diversion ratios. Column (3) shows the corresponding average travel parameter. Column(4)
shows the corresponding average true merger effects. Column (5) shows the corresponding
average mis-specified merger effects. Column (6) shows the corresponding average prediction
bias.
Column(4) of Table 2.10 show that the opposite predictions of merger effects on price A
happen with negative true merger effects on price A. Why would the true model predict lower
price of A, the non-merging licensor, after licensee-licensee merger? This is due to decrease
in alignment effect after the merger. In particular, after the licensee-licensee merger, the
prices of the licensees’ products increase, and their quantities decrease, which decreases how
much the licensor cares about the licensees’ sales. In fact, the alignment effects, in the case
of opposite prediction of price of the licensor, are always smaller after the merger, and on
average, decrease by 8.73%. While prices are strategic complements, the higher prices of B
and C lead to smaller positive effect on the price A than the negative effect due to lower
alignment effect. Such decrease in price of A after the licensee-licensee merger, also leads to
21For clarification, in Table 2.9, we note that the product-level over-prediction ratios for quantity effects
are small while the market-level over-prediction ratio is large. This is because the over-prediction at market-
level quantity effect is due to the under-prediction of quantity effect on product A: the increase in quantity
of A is under-predicted, thus the decrease in market-level quantities is over-predicted.
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decrease of profit of A after the merger, by about 0.23%.
To answer when the opposite predictions happen. Column (1) of Table 2.10 shows that
such opposite predictions typically happen at relatively extreme cases: royalty rates account
for 80% to 95% of total marginal costs on average. This is intuitive, because the larger the
royalty rates, the more important is the alignment effect. Column (2) and (3) of Table 2.10
shows that such opposite predictions happen with relatively low values of diversion ratios
and small travel parameter.
To answer how important are these opposite-prediction cases, we compare column (4) to
(6) in Table 2.10 to column (1) and (2) in Table 2.9. Comparing column (1) of Table 2.9 to
column (6) of Table 2.10, it shows that in the cases of opposite predictions, the prediction
biases are not quite different in magnitudes, if not smaller. Comparing column (2) of Table
2.9 to column (4) of Table 2.10, it shows that in the cases of opposite predictions, the
true merger effects are smaller in magnitudes. More importantly, we note that the average
prediction bias in merger effects on price A conditional on opposite prediction is 0.39%, while
the unconditional average prediction bias is 0.44% as reported in column (1) of Table 2.9.
The smaller conditional average prediction bias implies that while the channel of ignored
decrease in alignment effect after merger is driving the opposite predictions, there are other
larger prediction biases happening when the true merger effects on price A are positive22.
However, the conditional average prediction bias in merger effects on price A is larger than
unconditional average prediction biases in merger effects on price B and C as reported in
column (1) of Table 2.9. Therefore, we conclude that, ignored decrease in alignment effect
due to licensee-licensee merger is a driving force of prediction biases.
22Based on Equation 2.4 and the results in Table 2.9 and Table 2.10, we argue that estimation bias in
marginal cost of the licensor-manufacturer, ∆cA, is also a driving force for overall prediction biases. In
particular, given no opposite predictions on QA, the over-prediction ratio for merger effects on QA implies
that, in almost all cases, s̃′A < s
′
A. Since firm A is a single-product firm, vA = −1/(α(1 − sA)). Therefore,
ṽ′A < v
′
A in almost all cases. Then, both the second and the third terms in Equation 2.4 are negative,
the first term – marginal cost estimation bias – is the only positive term. Moreover, Table 2.9 shows that
on average, the prediction bias on merger effects on price A is 0.446%, which is positive. Therefore, on
average, the estimation bias on marginal costs is driving the prediction bias on post-merger prices of the
licensor-manufacturer, p′A.
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As a summary of main findings from theoretical simulations on licensor-licensee merger
and licensee-licensee merger, we show a result that should be alarming to researchers: unob-
served patent licensing relationships can lead to opposite prediction of merger effects. And
the opposite predictions are fundamentally due to ignored mechanisms: i) royalty payment
saving due to licensor-licensee merger; ii) smaller alignment effect due to licensee-licensee
merger. The good news is that, in the theoretical simulations, which is based on a symmetric
benchmark market, opposite predictions happen in relatively extreme cases. In particular,
opposite predictions happen when royalty rates account for about 80% of total marginal
costs.
Theoretical simulations also illustrate on the patterns between prediction bias and two
model primitives: i) royalty rates; ii) the sum of diversion ratios between the licensor and
licensees (controlled by the travel parameter). We find that larger royalty rates, larger bias
in marginal cost estimation and merger evaluations. We also find that with larger sum of
diversion ratios (i.e. substitutability), the bias in marginal cost estimation increases, but the
prediction biases in merger effects typically firstly increase then decrease.
Lastly, theoretical simulations find that, on average, merger effects are over-predicted.
In particular, for both licensor-licensee and licensee-licensee mergers, by ignoring patent-
licensing relationships, consumer surplus decrease is over-predicted(2.4% for licensor-licensee
merger, 0.2% for licensee-licensee merger), increase of sales-weighted average price is over-
predicted(2.65% for licensor-licensor merger, 0.25% for licensee-licensee merger), decrease
in total quantities is over-predicted (1.76% for licensor-licensee merger, 0.15% for licensee-
licensee merger), increase in producer-surplus is over-predicted (2.7% for licensor-licensee
merger, 2.95% for licensee-licensee merger). Moreover, on average, the prediction bias in
licensor-licensee merger is larger than that in licensee-licensee merger.
Guidance Simulation Results. Across the generated sample of simulated markets,
we analyze a horizontal merger between the two licensees, i.e., Firm B and Firm C, and
assess the predictions of counterfactual measures from the mis-specified model relative to
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those from the model accounting for the licensing in the market. We similarly evaluate how
these predictions change with respect to underlying model parameters which comprise the
alignment effect term, namely the royalty rate and the sum of diversion ratios.
In Figures 2.21 to 2.24, which plot simulated markets’ biases in predicted welfare measures
form a licensee-licensee merger against its royalty rate, we see similar trends to predictions
in the guidance simulations of the licensor-licensee merger case. The mis-specified overpre-
dicts increases in share-weighted prices (Figure 2.21), overpredicts decreases in inside shares
(Figure 2.22), and overpredicts decreases in consumer surplus (Figure 2.23), relative to the
true model, and the magnitudes of each of these overpredictions generally increases in the
market’s royalty rate, r. Additionally, for licensee-licensee mergers, a trend is present for
the prediction bias is producer surplus with respect to the royalty rate – the mis-specified
model overpredicts changes in producer surplus and the magnitude of this overprediction is
correlated with r (see Figure 2.24).
We also analyze how predictions differ based on the other component of the alignment
effect – the sum of the diversion ratios. In Figure 2.13, we see that the maximum overpre-
diction in share-weighted average prices is first increasing in the sum of diversion ratios and
then sharply drops at extreme values of the sum of diversion ratios. A similar pattern in
overprediction of decreases in total inside shares is shown in Figure 2.14. Correspondingly,
the overprediction in decrease in consumer surplus is largest at interior, but relatively large
values of the diversion ratios (Figure 2.15). Finally, the maximum bias in producer surplus
due to a licensee-licensee merger in increasing in the sum of the diversion ratios, as is shown
in Figure 2.16.
For licensee-licensee mergers, we want to understand when a mis-specified model predicts
the opposite sign of a key welfare measure, relatively to the effect under a true model. In
Table 2.12, we document, across the generated sample of markets, the average true effect,
average prediction bias, and the frequency in which an opposite prediction occurs for key
counterfactual objects – prices, shares, profits, and consumer surplus. We see, on average,
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due to the licensee-licensee merger, the true model predicts an increase in share-weighted
average prices (by 4.8%) and a decrease in inside shares (by 5.4%), which is associated
with an average decrease in consumer surplus (by 17.2%). In these three measures, prices,
shares, and consumer surplus, the mis-specified model overpredicts the respective effects,
however to a relatively small magnitude. For example, the mis-specified model overpredicts
the percentage decrease in consumer surplus by 2.2 percentage points. Further, we see that
in these three measures, the mis-specified model predicts the correct sign of the change in
welfare measure in all markets (column (3)). However, in terms of producer surplus, the
mis-specified model predicts an opposite effect in an overwhelming majority of markets in
the sample (87.6%).
What are the characteristics of the markets in which the true and mis-specified model
predict opposite effects? In Table 2.8, we detail the conditional distribution of market char-
acteristics for markets that exhibit opposite predictions between the true and mis-specified
model for at least one welfare measure. We see that relative to the distributions in the
full sample detailed in Table 2.2, the markets with opposite predictions have larger royalty
rates. However, in many other key measures, the conditional distributions of these market
characteristics are relatively close to those of the full sample.
Guidance Summary. In the guidance simulations, we assess differences in cost esti-
mates and counterfactual merger predictions between a mis-specified model that does not
take into account licensing behavior and a true model that does. In terms of costs, the bias
in estimation of a licensors cost from mis-specified model can be significant. Further, we
show that this estimation bias increases in the licensors royalty rate and exhibited larger
potential magnitudes in less concentrated markets.
This difference in estimated costs plays through to model predictions of counterfactual
scenarios. Using this sample of generated markets, we evaluate two mergers one between
the licensor and a licensee, and one between the two licensees. Under the licensor-licensee
merger, we show the mis-specified model overpredicts decreases in consumer surplus (from
68
overpredicting increases share-weighted average prices and thus overpredicting decreases in-
side shares) and, on average, overpredicts increases in producer surplus. The magnitude of
the overpredictions is shown to positive correlated in the licensors royalty rate. Further, we
show that the mis-specified model, under a licensor-licensee merger, can lead to policy rec-
ommendation opposite of that suggested by the true model. For example, the mis-specified
model always predicts a loss of consumer surplus due to the merger, while in approximately
one third of the simulated markets the true model predicts increases in consumer surplus.
Additionally, we use the generated sample to evaluate a licensee-licensee merger. Sim-
ilarly, under this type of merger, the mis-specified model overpredicts changes in prices,
shares, consumer and producer surplus, and these overpredictions increasing in underlying
royalty rate. However, opposite implied policy recommendations under the mis-specified
model are less frequent.
2.5 Conclusion
We use simulations to examine estimation bias in marginal costs and prediction bias in
merger evaluations due to not accounting for existing patent licensing relationships between
manufacturers. We examine two types of mergers: mergers between a licensor and a li-
censee and mergers between licensees. We use two sets of simulation approaches for two
complementary purposes: theoretical simulations for examining the relationships between
model primitives and biases; and guidance simulations to show the potential magnitude of
the biases and for what types of observed market features could be associated with larger
biases. We find that estimation bias in marginal costs are increasing with royalty rates and
the sum of diversion ratios between licensor and licensees. The guidance simulation shows
that such bias is typically not ignorable: the median estimation bias is 28% of true marginal
cost values.
We show an alarming finding to researchers: not accounting for existing patent licensing
relationships can lead to opposite prediction of merger effects. Such opposite predictions
show up in both theoretical simulations and guidance simulations for both licensor-licensee
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mergers and licensee-licensee mergers. Because the guidance simulations cover a richer set
of markets (including asymmetric markets) compared to the theoretical simulations that are
based on a symmetric benchmark market, opposite predictions show up more frequently in
guidance simulations. In particular, in the theoretical simulations, we find 4.3% to 4.4% of
cases where the merger effects on prices predicted from a mis-specified model not accounting
for existing patent licensing relationships are opposite to the true merger effects predicted
from a true model accounting for existing patent licensing relationships. In the guidance
simulations, such fraction of opposite prediction cases can be as high as 51.2%. Moreover,
both sets of simulations find that, opposite predictions happen when royalty rates are large.
In particular, theoretical simulation finds that opposite predictions happen when royalty
rates account for about 80% of total marginal costs; while guidance simulation finds that
opposite predictions happen at high values of royalty rates in the random sample of markets.
We also find the economic driving forces for opposite predictions in each type of mergers.
In licensor-licensee mergers, we find that ignored saving of royalty payment due to licensor-
licensee merger leads to decrease of prices and increase of consumer welfare after merger,
which causes opposite predictions if one assumes away the patent licensing relationships. In
licensee-licensee mergers, we find that ignored decrease in alignment effect due to licensee-
licensee merger leads to decrease of licensor’s price, which causes opposite predictions if one
assumes away the patent licensing relationships. We argue that these two ignored channels
when assuming away existing patent licensing relationships are also driving forces for overall
prediction biases that are unconditional on opposite predictions.
In both sets of simulations and both types of mergers, we find that market-level merger
effects are over-predicted when one assumes away existing patent licensing relationships. We
further find that, the prediction biases are smaller in licensee-licensee merger than those
in licensor-licensee merger. In particular, the guidance simulation finds that, in licensor-
licensee mergers, assuming away existing patent licensing relationships lead to over-predicted
increase of share-weighted average price by 2.6% at the median, and over-predicted decrease
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of consumer welfare by 9.3% at the median; in licensee-licensee mergers, the two median
predictions biases are 0.5% and 1.4% respectively.
We also examine the relationships between prediction biases, royalty rates, and sum of
diversion ratios between licensor and licensees. Theoretical simulations show that predic-
tion biases increase with royalty rates; while the guidance simulations also shows positive
correlations between the two. On the other hand, the theoretical simulation exhibits a
non-monotonic relationship between prediction biases and the sum of diversion ratios; while
the guidance simulations show that the potential for prediction biases (i.e., the maximum
prediction biases) is positively correlated with the sum of diversion ratios.
There are two important caveats on the analysis and findings in this chapter. First,
we assume an exogenous royalty rate that does not change upon merger. Additionally, we
impose that merging parties must merger, which may not be realistic if a given merger is not
profitable. In the future, we will exclude mergers that are not profitable from our simulation
analysis to allay this concern.
Additionally, as we aim to extend this theoretical exercise to understand the extent of
estimation and prediction bias in a real-life context, we hope to calibrate our model to an
empirical setting in future research.
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Table 2.1: The Benchmark Market in Theoretical Simulations
(a) Product Specific Values A B C (b) Common Values
Mean Utility (δ) 1/3 1/3 1/3 Price Coefficient (α) 0.2
Marginal Cost (c) 1 1 1 T1EV Scale (σε) 0.1
Royalty Rate (r) 0 0 0 Market Size(M) 1.0
Market Share (%)* 25% 25% 25% Taste Heterogeneity (σ) 0
Price 5/3 5/3 5/3 Travel Parameter (ρ) 0
Elasticity* -2.5 -2.5 -2.5
Notes: Equilibrium market outcomes that are used to back out the benchmark model primitives
(δ, α), given (c, r, σε, σ, ρ).
Table 2.2: Sample Statistics
Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Royalty Rate (r) 0.019 0.11 0.225 0.353 0.538
Shares:
sA 0.046 0.172 0.267 0.342 0.483
sB 0.035 0.145 0.246 0.33 0.469
sC 0.034 0.15 0.246 0.333 0.444
Total Inside Share 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
HHI:
Pre-Merger 1895 2025 2256 2617 3274
Post-AB Merger 2636 2799 3026 3553 4721
∆ from AB Merger 145 505 760 1167 2117
Post-BC Merger 2558 2633 2737 2924 3534
∆ from BC Merger 72 356 527 615 692
Margins (Pre-Merger):
mA 0.275 0.366 0.498 0.606 0.708
mB 0.302 0.414 0.567 0.714 0.891
mC 0.293 0.429 0.57 0.712 0.898
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.286 0.401 0.539 0.673 0.862
Costs:
cA 0.292 0.394 0.502 0.634 0.725
cB 0.333 0.577 0.701 0.79 0.864
cC 0.361 0.578 0.704 0.791 0.869
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.326 0.486 0.602 0.701 0.789
Market Elasticity -7.187 -4.625 -3.369 -2.494 -1.707
Note: Market elasticity under logit demand is given by αp̄(1− s0), where p̄ represents the share-weighed average price.
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Table 2.3: Bias in Cost Estimation
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
%∆cA 0.025 0.13 0.28 0.493 0.987
Note: Bias in cost estimation is defined as the percentage difference between costs implied by the mis-specified model and the
true costs, i.e., %∆cj = (c̃j − cj)/cj . Given licensees’ first order conditions are identical between the mis-specified and true
models, %∆cB = %∆cC = 0 .
Table 2.4: Theoretical Simulation: Predict the Effects of Licensor-Licensee Merger
(1) (2) (3) (4)
avg. prediction bias avg. true effect over-prediction opposite prediction
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Consumer Surplus -2.414 -10.668 100 0
Sales-weighted Avg. Price 2.655 8.283 100 0.03
Price: A 0.65 16.334 98.812 0
Price: B 6.237 8.302 100 4.307
Price: C 0.887 2.612 100 0
Total Quantities -1.761 -5.85 100 0
Quantity: A 1.218 -18.916 0 0
Quantity: B -7.664 -4.987 99.594 25.228
Quantity: C 1.249 5.577 100 0
Producer Surplus 2.773 4.715 100 0
Profit: A+B 2.206 2.516 100 0
Profit: C 2.635 9.65 100 0
Note: results are conditional on positive royalty rates.
Table 2.5: Theoretical Simulation: Mis-specified Model Predicts Opposite
Licensor-Licensee Merger Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
royalty diversion travel true mis-specified prediction
rates ratios parameters effects effects biases
r d ρ %∆y %∆ỹ ∆∆y
Sales-weighted Avg. Price 0.99 0.907 1 -0.159 3.931 4.090
consumer surplus -1.067 -2.819 -1.752
total quantities -0.712 -1.898 -1.186
producer surplus 2.363 12.970 10.606
Price: B 0.947 0.402 0.313 -0.778 10.835 11.613
consumer surplus -6.100 -11.101 -5.002
sales-weighted avg. price 4.671 9.596 4.925
total quantities -4.272 -7.863 -3.591
producer surplus 1.970 4.538 2.568
Quantity: B 0.859 0.464 0.422 2.733 -10.336 -13.069
consumer surplus -6.491 -10.797 -4.307
sales-weighted avg. price 5.493 10.051 4.558
total quantities -4.557 -7.666 -3.109
producer surplus 2.629 6.235 3.606
Note: results are conditional on opposite predictions.
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Table 2.6: Bias in Licensor-Licensee Merger Prediction
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Prices:
pA -0.009 0 0.002 0.005 0.013
pB 0.007 0.041 0.08 0.126 0.2
pC 0 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.018
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.001 0.009 0.026 0.053 0.098
Shares:
sA 0.001 0.013 0.044 0.12 0.254
sB -1.037 -0.486 -0.228 -0.092 -0.011
sC 0.002 0.018 0.058 0.152 0.357
Inside Shares -0.139 -0.072 -0.032 -0.011 -0.001
Profits:
πA 0.016 0.131 0.289 0.454 0.633
πB -4.415 -1.972 -0.813 -0.307 -0.035
πC 0.003 0.027 0.083 0.197 0.403
Producer Surplus 0.003 0.024 0.048 0.075 0.1
Consumer Surplus -0.509 -0.235 -0.093 -0.033 -0.004
Note: Post-merger licensing revenues allocated to πA.
Table 2.7: Average Bias and Opposite Predictions in Licensor-Licensee Mergers
(1) (2) (3)
Avg. True Effect Avg. Prediction Bias Opposite Prediction
Prices:
pA 0.099 0.002 0
pB 0.014 0.089 0.499
pC 0.003 0.006 0.326
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.02 0.035 0.363
Shares:
sA -0.269 0.077 0.011
sB 0.126 -0.342 0.609
sC 0.049 0.103 0.326
Inside Shares -0.02 -0.047 0.327
Profits:
πA -0.272 0.3 0.702
πB 1.384 -1.367 0.245
πC 0.057 0.13 0.326
Producer Surplus 0.029 0.05 0.091
Consumer Surplus -0.05 -0.157 0.327
Note: Average true effect is given by percent change. Average prediction bias is given by the difference in percent changes
between the mis-specified model. Opposite prediction represents a different sign in counterfactual prediction of a given
measure between the true and mis-specified model.
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Table 2.8: Opposite Prediction Market Characteristics
Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Royalty Rate (r) 0.168 0.27 0.372 0.486 0.603
Shares:
sA 0.017 0.098 0.204 0.297 0.429
sB 0.041 0.163 0.271 0.354 0.509
sC 0.063 0.188 0.278 0.354 0.518
Total Inside Share 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
HHI:
Pre-Merger 1894 2029 2324 2700 3360
Post Merger 2858 3058 3395 3956 5263
∆ from Merger 133 603 1118 1651 2536
Margins (Pre-Merger):
mA 0.267 0.362 0.483 0.576 0.68
mB 0.351 0.479 0.627 0.784 0.92
mC 0.359 0.481 0.645 0.771 0.919
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.339 0.472 0.618 0.749 0.87
Costs:
cA 0.32 0.424 0.517 0.638 0.733
cB 0.516 0.689 0.772 0.835 0.889
cC 0.457 0.694 0.775 0.826 0.892
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.447 0.582 0.664 0.75 0.823
Market Elasticity -8.546 -5.797 -4.531 -3.5 -2.474
Note: Market elasticity under logit demand is given by αp̄(1− s0), where p̄ represents the share-weighed average price
Table 2.9: Theoretical Simulation: Predict the Effects of Licensee-Licensee Merger
(1) (2) (3) (4)
avg. prediction bias avg. true effect over-prediction opposite prediction
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Consumer Surplus -0.203 -10.888 99.921 0
Sales-weighted Avg. Price 0.253 11.27 99.95 0
Price:A 0.446 2.221 97.911 4.446
Price:B 0.103 16.819 97.97 0
Price:C 0.093 16.722 97.089 0
Total Quantities -0.152 -7.089 99.921 0
Quantity: A -0.687 10.599 0.01 0
Quantity: B 0.079 -15.631 0.386 0
Quantity: C 0.099 -15.048 0.198 0
Producer Surplus 2.959 4.901 100 0
Profit:A 9.571 5.581 100 4.119
Profit:B+C 0.237 4.678 99.98 0
Note: results are conditional on positive royalty rates.
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Table 2.10: Theoretical Simulation: Mis-specified Model Predicts Opposite
Licensee-Licensee Merger Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
royalty diversion travel true mis-specified prediction
rates ratios parameters effects effects biases
r d ρ %∆y %∆ỹ ∆∆y
Price: A 0.801 0.348 0.085 -0.191 0.199 0.391
consumer surplus -9.757 -9.967 -0.210
sales-weighted avg. price 7.500 7.691 0.190
total quantities -6.018 -6.167 -0.149
producer surplus 1.046 2.958 1.912
Profit: A 0.953 0.370 0.177 -0.225 6.458 6.683
consumer surplus -9.838 -10.138 -0.300
sales-weighted avg. price 7.955 8.238 0.283
total quantities -6.278 -6.496 -0.219
producer surplus 0.909 3.345 2.435
Note: results are conditional on opposite predictions.
Table 2.11: Bias in Licensee-Licensee Merger Prediction
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Prices:
pA 0 0.003 0.009 0.018 0.038
pB 0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006
pC 0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006
Share-Weighted Avg. 0 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.017
Shares:
sA -0.237 -0.07 -0.026 -0.008 -0.001
sB 0 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.022
sC 0 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.022
Inside Shares -0.026 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 0
Profits:
πA 0.004 0.044 0.112 0.238 0.564
πB 0.011 0.135 0.549 1.803 12.361
πC 0.012 0.13 0.523 1.848 13.756
Producer Surplus 0.024 0.14 0.282 0.423 0.591
Consumer Surplus -0.07 -0.034 -0.014 -0.005 -0.001
Note: Post-merger licensee profits allocated to each respective pre-merger licensee product.
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Table 2.12: Average Bias and Opposite Predictions in Licensee-Licensee Mergers
(1) (2) (3)
Avg. True Effect Avg. Prediction Bias Opposite Prediction
Prices:
pA -0.003 0.012 0.512
pB 0.098 0.002 0
pC 0.099 0.002 0
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.048 0.006 0
Shares:
sA 0.2 -0.061 0
sB -0.203 0.007 0.006
sC -0.205 0.007 0.002
Inside Shares -0.054 -0.008 0
Profits:
πA 0.002 0.171 0.513
πB -17.953 17.976 0.623
πC -4.885 4.907 0.624
Producer Surplus -0.214 0.29 0.876
Consumer Surplus -0.172 -0.022 0
Note: Post-merger licensee profits allocated to each respective pre-merger licensee product.
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Table 2.13: Opposite Prediction Market Characteristics
Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Royalty Rate (r) 0.069 0.16 0.249 0.378 0.551
Shares:
sA 0.05 0.175 0.269 0.345 0.491
sB 0.03 0.139 0.242 0.326 0.473
sC 0.029 0.145 0.244 0.333 0.452
Total Inside Share 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
HHI:
Pre-Merger 1895 2029 2269 2642 3345
Post Merger 2564 2641 2744 2926 3538
∆ from Merger 68 339 522 616 696
Margins (Pre-Merger):
mA 0.276 0.365 0.498 0.606 0.707
mB 0.31 0.419 0.576 0.715 0.891
mC 0.298 0.438 0.575 0.721 0.903
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.315 0.439 0.577 0.709 0.846
Costs:
cA 0.293 0.394 0.502 0.635 0.724
cB 0.437 0.619 0.719 0.801 0.867
cC 0.411 0.611 0.726 0.8 0.873
Share-Weighted Avg. 0.371 0.513 0.617 0.709 0.791
Market Elasticity -7.382 -4.805 -3.63 -2.675 -1.923
Note: Market elasticity under logit demand is given by αp̄(1− s0), where p̄ represents the share-weighed average price
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical Simulation: marginal cost estimation bias and royalty rates and the
sum of diversion ratios between the licensor and the two licensees.
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Figure 2.2: Guidance Simulations: estimation bias in costs between mis-specified and true
models for the licensor (firm A)
Figure 2.3: Guidance Simulations: estimation bias in costs between mis-specified and true
models for firm A (licensor) by HHI
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Figure 2.4: Guidance Simulations: estimation bias in costs between mis-specified and true
models for firm A (licensor) by model parameters
Figure 2.5: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in consumer welfare merger effect from
the merger between licensor and licensee.
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Figure 2.6: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in sales-weighted average price merger
effect from the merger between licensor and licensee.
Figure 2.7: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in total quantity merger effect from the
merger between licensor and licensee.
82
Figure 2.8: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in producer surplus merger effect from
the merger between licensor and licensee.
Figure 2.9: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted average price
merger effect from the merger between licensor and licensee by licensing royalty rate.
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Figure 2.10: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the total quantities merger effect
from the merger between licensor and licensee by licensing royalty rate.
Figure 2.11: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the consumer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensor and licensee by licensing royalty rate.
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Figure 2.12: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the producer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensor and licensee by licensing royalty rate.
Figure 2.13: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted average price
merger effect from the merger between licensor and licensee by sum of diversion ratios.
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Figure 2.14: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the total quantities merger effect
from the merger between licensor and licensee by sum of diversion ratios.
Figure 2.15: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the consumer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensor and licensee by sum of diversion ratios.
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Figure 2.16: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the producer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensor and licensee by sum of diversion ratios.
Figure 2.17: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in consumer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensees.
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Figure 2.18: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in sales-weighted average price merger
effect from the merger between licensees.
Figure 2.19: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in total quantities merger effect from
the merger between licensees.
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Figure 2.20: Theoretical Simulation: prediction bias in producer surplus merger effect from
the merger between licensees.
Figure 2.21: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted average price
merger effect from the merger between licensees by licensing royalty rate.
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Figure 2.22: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted price merger
effect from the merger between licensees by licensing royalty rate.
Figure 2.23: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the consumer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensees by licensing royalty rate.
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Figure 2.24: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the producer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensees by licensing royalty rate.
Figure 2.25: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted average price
merger effect from the merger between licensees by sum of diversion ratios.
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Figure 2.26: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the total quantities merger effect
from the merger between licensees by sum of diversion ratios.
Figure 2.27: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the consumer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensees by sum of diversion ratios.
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Figure 2.28: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the producer surplus merger effect
from the merger between licensees by sum of diversion ratios.
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Chapter 3
Product Responses to Income-Based Subsidies in the U.S. Infant
Formula Industry
3.1 Introduction
Consumption subsidies are a common tool introduced in markets to encourage uptake of a
good or service. A complete understanding of the effect these consumption subsidies have
on market outcomes is important in informing welfare-enhancing policy.
Subsidizing the purchase of a good or service will have a direct impact on demand. De-
mand subsidies may induce consumers to purchase a good or service that exhibits positive
externalities who were not previously, such as in education. Alternatively, these subsidies
may aim to induce consumers to substitute to an alternative good or service, such as to elec-
tronic vehicles, away from one that exhibits negative externalities, such as from combustion
engine vehicles.
Due to consumption subsidies having a direct effect on demand, firms, as demand-takers,
are likely to respond. Firms can respond to demand-side subsidies in a number of ways,
including prices and quality (i.e., product characteristics). For example, firms may respond
to a consumption subsidy by increasing price(s) or lowering the quality of their existing
product(s). We would expect each of these responses to attenuate consumer welfare rel-
ative to when price(s) and quality are fixed, respectively. Thus, to accurately assess the
implications of demand-side subsidy policies and resulting welfare, economic models must
accurately incorporate relevant supply-side responses.
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An additional key margin to consider in evaluating the effects of demand-side subsidies is
producer product offering adjustment. That is, firms may adjust the number of products they
offer in response to a subsidy policy change, which will impact resulting welfare. Consider a
newly-implemented demand-side subsidy. As this subsidy alters the price consumers face, we
would expect marginal consumers to adjust purchasing behavior, whether switching to/from
another product or to/from purchasing a product at all, depending on their price sensitivity.
Thus, given these substitution patterns, the subsidy will affect the aggregate market shares
amongst products differently. If consumers shift sufficiently away from a given product due
to the implemented demand-side subsidy, it may no longer be profitable for the supplying
firm to offer this product. This reduction in the number of product offerings will impact the
resulting consumer welfare through available variety.
This chapter will look to understand this product adjustment margin, while incorporating
price responses, and the associated effects on welfare. Concisely, what are the (short-run)
welfare effects of income-based consumption subsidies when accounting for firm pricing and
product offerings responses?
This chapter is related to three strains of the literature. First, the subsidy literature
has investigated how firms in imperfect competition respond to demand-side subsidies in a
variety of contexts. Decarolis (2015) and Jaffe and Shepard (2018) find pricing distortions due
to subsidies in health insurance markets. A number of studies incorporate product quality
responses in health insurance markets (see e.g., Starc and Town (2015)). Springel (2017) and
Li (2017) evaluate subsidies in the electric car market and the effect demand subsides have
on firm investment. This chapter contributes to the subsidy literature by incorporating the
role of the product offering adjustment margin, in addition to price responses, in accessing
welfare effects of a demand-side subsidy.
Second, this chapter adds to the literature evaluating the U.S. infant formula industry
and associated Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(“WIC”) subsidies. For example, Oliveira, Frazao, and Smallwood (2010) show that be-
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tween 2004–2006, adjusting for inflation, manufacturer prices of infant formula purchased by
vouchers increased significantly. In addition, Oliveira et al. (2004) find, using cross-sectional
evidence, that geographic markets with a higher proportion of the population eligible for
WIC subsidies face higher prices for infant formula. This chapter contributes to the litera-
ture on the U.S. infant formula industry by building a structural model, featuring endogenous
product offerings, to evaluate relevant policy counterfactuals.
Third, this chapter uses the framework of the endogenous product choice literature (as
reviewed in Crawford (2012)) to evaluate welfare implications of counterfactual policy. In-
corporating price responses, this literature has evaluated the policy implications of endoge-
nous product characteristics (e.g., Fan (2013) and Sweeting (2010)) and endogenous product
offerings (e.g., Wollman (2017), Fan and Yang (2020), and Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim
(2009)). Most closely related to this work is Guglielmo (2016), which builds a structural
model that features endogenous coverage quality to back out provider costs for individuals
in two substitutable Medicare programs and evaluate a counterfactual subsidy policy. Two
main differences exist between Guglielmo (2016) and this chapter. First, as detailed below,
in my context, consumers do not choose which subsidy program to enroll in, instead, con-
sumers’ subsidization status is (plausibly) exogeneously determined. Second, in my model,
I consider the product offerings margin, instead of firms choosing product characteristics.
This chapter contributes to the literature by assessing the role of endogenous product choice
play in evaluating the welfare effects of a demand-side subsidy.
3.2 Empirical Setting
I will investigate this research question in the context of the U.S. infant formula industry.
This industry is an ideal setting to study my research question because it exhibits a number
of appealing qualities: products are differentiated by observable physical characteristics,
supply is relatively concentrated, and only a portion of consumers receive subsidies.
Infant formula is used as a substitute for breast milk for infants between birth and
twelve months of age. While breast milk is recommended as the optimal source of nutrition
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for infants by the members of the scientific community, such as the American Academy
of Pediatrics and regulatory agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, due to
choice or necessity, for example, mothers with HIV avoiding transmission to their infants,
manufactured infant formula can supplement or replace breast milk in an infant’s diet.
Infant formula is produced in three mutually exhaustive forms: i) powder, which requires
the addition of boiled water, in an approximate ratio of seven parts water to one part powder
formula, to reconstitute to a consumable form; ii) liquid concentrate, which also requires the
addition of water, at a ratio of one-to-one; and iii) ready-to-feed, which requires no additional
preparations prior to consumption.1 Infant formula, in any of the three forms, is primarily
made up of a protein, often derived from cow’s milk, a carbohydrate, vegetable fats, and a
micronutrient mix, to mimic naturally occurring human breast milk.2
Infant formula in the U.S. is largely supplied by three primary national manufacturers.
These suppliers, Abbott Laboratories, Mead Johnson, and Nestlé-Gerber, account for over
90 percent of the national market share by volume from 2006–2015 (see Figure ?? below).
Infant formula manufacturers develop new infant formula over a number of years. In
order to sell a new infant formula product in the U.S., suppliers must notify the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) with nutritional content and production process details
90 days prior to marketing and distributing the proposed infant formula product. This
development process gives rise to a firm’s portfolio of infant formula products. Products in
each firm’s portfolio are often marketed under the same brand. For example, Abbott markets
its products under the Similac brand, such as Similac Pro-Advance or Similac Sensitive.
In the U.S., as a part of the WIC program, households below 185% of the federal poverty
level are eligible to receive infant formula vouchers. These vouchers are provided by state
WIC agencies and are redeemable for up to 800 reconstituted ounces per month per household
of infant formula3 at no cost to the voucher recipient. However, vouchers are only able to
1In my sample, I observe negligible sales of ready-to-feed formula and thus omit this form from the
analysis.
2See Mead Johnson 2012 10-K filing
3Approximately equal to the average infant monthly nutritional intake.
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be applied to a single brand of infant formula, which non-recipients may also purchase. The
price consumers pay for this single WIC-designated brand without WIC vouchers is federally
mandated to be equal to that paid by the state agency via WIC vouchers. This lack of ability
to price discriminate between WIC and non-WIC consumers is captured in the model below.
The exclusive right to supply formula for purchase by WIC vouchers varies by state and
is allocated by first price auction. Manufacturers submit sealed bids for the amount per unit
sold they are willing to rebate the respective state agency for each unit of infant formula
purchased with WIC vouchers. The manufacturer that submits the lowest net price bid,
defined by the difference between the manufacturer’s lowest national wholesale price per
unit and a proposed rebate rate, receives the exclusive contract, effective for typically three
to five years.
In this chapter, I will focus on the infant formula in Michigan between January 2012 and
December 2015. During this time period, Mead Johnson’s Enfamil Premium infant formula,
in each of the three possible product forms, was eligible for purchase by WIC vouchers
in Michigan. For each reconstituted ounce sold, Mead Johnson rebated a publicly known,
contractually-fixed amount to the state WIC agency.
3.3 Data
To analyze my research question, I rely upon infant formula sales data from the Nielsen
Retail Scanner Dataset, which tracks consumer purchases at point-of-sale for more than
90 retail chains across the U.S. Specifically, the sales data indicates the quantity and total
expenditure for a given product at a given store, in a given week. Attributes, such as the
form of the infant formula product, are also included in the data. To decrease the likelihood
of the model falsely interpreting zero observed sales of a product as one not being offered,
instead of in reality, consumers choosing not to purchase the produced product, I follow the
literature and aggregate to the month level.4 Additionally, since geographic information for
stores are only available at the Designated Market Area (“DMA”), as defined by Nielsen, I
4For example, see Miravete, Seim, and Thurk (2017)
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aggregate product-specific quantity and expenditures by DMA. From this, I determine the
average price and total quantity purchased for each infant formula product by month-DMA.5
Table 3.1 below details summary statistics for the product characteristics observed in the
sample. We see that during my sample period, the average price per reconstituted ounce of
formula is $0.18. A large majority of product-market-month observations are in powder form
in the sample (0.95). To improve the specification of the demand model (detailed below),
additional physical product attributes, such as nutritional content, could be collected and
implemented in the utility specification.
To measure market size, following Nevo (2001), I define market size as 750 ounces multi-
plied by the number of infant households in a given DMA-month. Total infant households at
the state-level is provided by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. Num-
ber of infant households amongst the subpopulation eligible for WIC vouchers are provided
by USDA Food and Nutritional Service at the state level. I weight the number of infant
households in a given subpopulation at the state level by the overall population propor-
tion belonging to each DMA in 2016, as indicated by Nielsen, to calculate the approximate
number of infant households in each subpopulation in a given DMA-month.
For the rebate rate paid from Mead Johnson to the Michigan WIC agency for each voucher
purchase of Enfamil Premium, I use the contractually agreed upon rate between these two
entities. As stated on the contract between the State of Michigan and Mead Johnson &
Company LLC, effective November 1, 2011 through October 31, 2016,6 for each reconstituted
ounce of Enfamil Premium purchased by WIC vouchers, Mead Johnson rebated $0.128 for
powdered form, $0.151 for liquid concentrate form, or $0.074 for ready-to-feed form.7 To
avoid any potential intertemporal effects from the contract start and end dates, I restrict
5Nielsen subdivides Michigan into seven DMAs, one of which, “Alpena”, I remove due to having a
population less than 100 times smaller than the largest DMA population, “Detroit”.
6Contract No. 071B1300297
7I do not observe any purchases of Enfamil Premium in ready-to-feed form. Federal regulation requires
state WIC agencies to provide vouchers for liquid concentrate and powder forms only. Vouchers for ready-to-
feed formulation may be granted by the state WIC agency for households with restricted access to sanitary
water or refrigeration.
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my sample to January 2012 through December 2015. From Table 3.1, we see that, among
the 432 (7.3%) product-market-month observations eligible for WIC (i.e., Enfamil Premium)
during this time period, the average rebate paid by Mead Johnson to the state was $0.14
relative to an average price of $0.18.
3.4 Model
In order to understand how income-based demand subsidies affect product offerings, and
thus equilibrium outcomes and welfare measures, I develop a structural model of demand
and supply of the infant formula industry that will allow me to conduct counterfactual
analyses.
The model is static with firms optimally setting product offerings and prices and house-
holds optimally choosing an infant formula or the outside good.
In each period t, in every geographic market m, each firm f :
1. Simultaneously chooses a set of products Jfmt to produce from an existing stock of
potential products Jfmt;
2. Observes demand and marginal cost shocks;
3. Simultaneously sets prices of products chosen in Step 1.
Then, households choose the available product or outside option that yields the highest
utility. When making this decision, households account for their WIC status, set of produced
products, and their associated product characteristics, including price. The outside option
to purchasing and consuming an infant formula product is breast feeding.
The model can be solved by backwards induction, starting with the household’s discrete
choice problem, then considering the pricing and subsequently product offering firm decisions.
3.4.1 Demand: Household’s Problem
On the demand side, infant households in a given geographic market decide between infant
formula products or the outside option. Adapting the models of Berry, Carnall, and Spiller
(2006) and Berry and Jia (2010) that allow for different underlying preference parameters for
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different subpopulations, underlying household preferences are allowed to depend on their
WIC voucher status. Specifically, household i belonging to subgroup g ∈ {WIC, non-WIC}
derives indirect utility from purchasing and consuming inside product j during period t in
geographic market m, which is given by,
Uigjmt = xjβ̃ig − α̃igp∗gjmt + λfmt + ξjmt + εigjmt (3.1)
where xj is a 1×K vector representing the observable physical product characteristics (i.e.,
powder or liquid concentrate form).
The random coefficients on product attributes, β̃ and α̃, allow within-subgroup het-
erogeneity in preferences over product attributes to yield reasonable substitution patterns.
Accurately capturing substitution patterns is critical in understanding demand response
to changes in product offerings. The random coefficient on physical product characteristic
k ∈ {1, ..., K} is given by,
β̃igk = βgk + σβgkνβgk , where νβgk ∼ N(0, 1) (3.2)
βgk captures the mean preference for product characteristic k amongst the subgroup g
and σβgk the variation in this preference within g.
Price per reconstituted ounce in a given market-time period depends on the WIC status
of the consumer and the product. WIC voucher holders purchasing a WIC-designated in-
fant formula product face no price, while non-WIC products and non-WIC consumers face
manufacturer-set prices. That is,
p∗gjmt =
 0, if g = WIC, j = WICpgjmt, otherwise (3.3)
I make the reasonable assumption that WIC consumers only consider WIC products or
the outside good (i.e., they do not purchase non-WIC products). Therefore, given WIC
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households purchasing WIC products do not face prices, I only consider a random coefficient
on price for the non-WIC subpopulation, which is given by,
α̃igk = αg + σαgναg , where ναg ∼ N(0, 1) for g = WIC (3.4)
Similar to the random coefficient on product characteristics, within the subgroup g =
WIC, mean utility for price is given by αg and variance σαg .
To capture a firm-specific component to utility, λfmt contains a firm fixed effect. Simi-
larly, market and time fixed effects are included to capture differences in preferences across
geographic markets and over time. Thus, the demand shock ξmtj represents the market-
time-specific unobservable deviation from mean valuation.8 Following the discrete choice
literature, εigjmt follows the Type I extreme value distribution and is independently and
identically distribution (i.i.d.) across households. The utility of the outside good, breast
feeding, is normalized to zero, i.e.,
Uig0mt = εig0mt (3.5)
where, as with the inside good utilities, εig0mt follows the Type I extreme value distribution
and i.i.d.
For notational ease, let θWIC ≡ (αWIC , βWIC , σαWIC , σβWIC ),
θnon−WIC ≡ (βnon−WIC , σβnon−WIC ), and θ ≡ (θWIC , θnon-WIC , λ).
Given the distributional assumption on the error term, εigjmt, the model implies aver-
age purchase probabilities for each subgroup g by integrating over the joint distribution of
random coefficients, F . Subgroup-specific average purchase probabilities are given by,
sgjmt(x, p, ξ; θg, λf ) =
∫
exp(xjβ̃ig − α̃igpgjmt + λf + ξjmt)
1 +
∑
k exp(xkβ̃ig − α̃igpgkmt + λf + ξkmt)
dFg (3.6)
8See discussion in Nevo (2001)
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Ideally, estimation of θg would come from taking this expression to data; however,
subgroup-specific market shares are not observed in the data. Therefore, to bring the de-
mand side of the model to observed overall market shares, subgroup purchase probabilities
in equation (6) must be weighted by the observed proportion of households belonging to
each subgroup, ζgmt,





jmt(x, p, ξ; θg, λf ) (3.7)
where
∑
g ζgmt = 1 for all m and t.
In a given market mt, the change in consumer surplus for a sub-group g for a coun-
terfactual scenario, with associated values denoted by x1, relative to the observed scenario,



















where Uigjmt is given by Equation 3.1.
3.4.2 Supply: Firm’s Problem
The supply model can be solved by backwards induction, taking market-level demand as
given from the household’s problem above in Equation (3.7).
Step 3: Pricing Decision
At each time period t, in each geographic market m, for each product in the set of products
Jfmt ⊆Jfmt that each firm f chooses to produce in Step 1, firms simultaneously set prices
that maximize profits in Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Define variable profits for firm f in
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jmt(x, p, ξ; θg, λf )(pjmt −mcjmt − I{j,g∈WIC}rebj)
}
(3.9)
where Mmt is the total number of infant households and ζgmt is defined as in the demand
model above. Per reconsitituted ounce variable profits are given by the price charged, pjmt,
less the marginal cost of producing an additional ounce of the product, mcjmt, and, if appli-
cable, the contractually-set rebate paid to the state WIC agency, rebj.
Total profits in a given market-time period, which incorporates product fixed costs are
then




where Fjmt is the per-market, per-period fixed cost of supplying product j.
To back out product-specific marginal costs, we can take the first order condition of the
profit function in equation (8) (or similarly to equation (9)) with respect to price and collapse













where p∗jmt represents the profit-maximizing price, ∇psg represents the gradient matrix of
subgroup g market shares with respect to prices times an ownership matrix for firm f that
contains indicators for all products produced by f (as in Miravete, Seim, Thurk (2017)). By
setting ζWIC = 0, we can see that equation (10) nests the standard expression for marginal
cost in terms of price and the optimal markup.
Then marginal cost can be parameterized as,
ln
(
pjmt + µjmt(x, p, ξ, θ)
)
= Wjγ + ωjmt (3.12)
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where Wj are observable cost shifters, such as the price of cow’s milk and observed physical
product attributes, γ is a parameter (vector) to be estimated, and ωj is an unobservable (to
the econometrician) marginal cost shock.
Step 2: Demand and Cost Shock Realizations
Prior to setting prices, firms observe marginal cost shocks ω and demand shifters ξ. As in
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), the timing of this step aids identification. As detailed
further below, we require exogeneity of demand shocks ξ and product characteristics x, i.e.,
E[ξ|x] = 0.
Step 1: Product Choice
Prior to observing demand and marginal cost shocks, firms must choose which products to
supply in each market. We assume firms offer the set of products that bring the highest
profits in expectation.




where the expectation of profits, defined in equation (9) above, is with respect to demand
and cost shocks. The portfolio of available products, Jft, is assumed to be any product
produced by firm f prior to and including time period t.
3.5 Estimation
In order to estimate demand and supply parameters of the model detailed above, we can
follow the discrete choice demand estimation literature (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995),
Nevo (2001)). To eventually simulate counterfactual policies, as detailed below, of interest are
the demand parameters governing the household’s problem, namely, the mean and variance
of the random coefficients, β and α, and the fixed effects, λ. Additionally, we are interested
in recovering product-specific marginal costs, mc, and cost shifter parameters γ, and product
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fixed costs, F .
3.5.1 Demand
To estimate the true underlying demand parameters, θ0, we want to determine the value of
θ that is consistent with the observed infant formula sales data. We can do so by taking
generalized method of moments (GMM) approach that takes the model to observed data to
infer demand parameter values.
To develop moment conditions, we rely on the identification assumption that demand
shock ξ is exogenous to a chosen instrument Z. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995), the excluded element of Z is constructed, for a given product-market-time produced
by firm f , by summing the characteristics of products produced by competing firms, x−f .
The included elements of the instrument are the characteristics for of firm f ’s product,
xj, and a constant. As indicated in Step 2 of the supply model, the timing assumption
that demand shocks ξ are observed only after product choices are made (Step 1) implies
the excluded and included elements of this instrument is independent of ξ. Further, the
instrument is relevant, as firm f sets prices with respect to product space competition, that
is, it takes xf and x−f into account.
We can then use this exogeneity of the instrument and demand shocks to form the
required moment condition,
E[ξjmt(x, p, s; θ)|Zjmt] = 0⇒ E[Z ′jmt ξjmt(x, p, s; θ)] = 0 (3.14)
Then, to determine the estimate θ̂ of the true parameter θ0, we search over the parameter
space and evaluate the GMM objective function. Specifically, for a given guess of θ,
1. Determine ξjmt that is consistent with observed market shares sjmt, prices p
∗
jmt, and
product characteristics xj, and the guess of demand parameters, θ, by employing a
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contraction mapping, in the spirit of Berry (1994),
ξMjmt = ξ
M−1
jmt + log(sjmt)− log(sjmt(x, p, ξ; θ)) (3.15)
where sjmt is observed market share of product j in marketm at time t and sjmt(x, p, ξ; θ)
is its model-implied analogue. Convergence is achieved when ||ξMjmt−ξM−1jmt || ≤ εtol, ∀j,m, t
for a desired level of tolerance, εtol, which occurs when the model market shares (closely)
match observed market shares. Let ξ(x, p, s; θ) represent the vector of product-market-
time demand shocks that result from the contraction mapping in Equation 3.15.
2. Use the value of ξ(x, p, s; θ) from Step 1 to generate a vector of moment conditions as
a sample analogue to the second expression in equation (13),





Z ′jmtξjmt(x, p, s; θ) (3.16)
where N represents the total number of product-market-time periods. The number
of (included and excluded) instruments equals the dimension of moment condition
vector, m(·). To identify θ, we require the number of moments, and thus the number
of instruments, to be at least as large as the dimension of θ. As evident from (13),
we can generate additional excluded instruments by taking arbitrary functions of the
excluded elements of Z. In my estimation routine, excluded instruments are calculated
as other firms’ product characteristics, other firms’ product characteristics squared, and
interaction terms of other firms’ product characteristics such that rank(Z) > dim(θ).
We can search over the parameter space to find the value of θ that is most consistent




(m(x, p, s; θ))′ W m(x, p, s; θ) (3.17)
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where W represents a weight matrix. In estimation, I employ a two-step routine to first
determine θ̂1 that satisfies expression (16) with W as the identity matrix. From this estimate











Then, I re-run the GMM procedure with W = W (θ̂1) to determine θ̂2, a consistent
estimate of θ0.
3.5.2 Supply
Marginal Costs. Estimation of the marginal cost parameter γ can come from a similar
exogeneity assumption as demand. For a given guess of γ, the marginal cost shock ω, as a
function of data and demand parameter θ, can be backed out from Equation 3.11.
Fixed Costs. Once demand and marginal cost parameters are estimated, fixed costs, Fj,
can be set identified exploiting necessary expected profit-maximizing conditions on product
offerings from Step 1 of the supply model.9
The necessary profit-maximizing condition states that, for firm f , fixing competing firms’
strategies, any alternative set of products J ′fmt ⊆Jft than the observed choice Jfmt, would,
in expectation, yield lower profits to the firm (with re-optimized prices for all j ∈ J ′fmt).
This follows from the optimal product set choice detailed in expression [X] above.
We see that, in a given market and time, if firm f was forced to produce and sell a
product j′ that was not produced in actuality, generating variable profits but incurring a
fixed cost from j′, the firm’s expected profits, with respect to demand and marginal cost
shocks, must be less than the observed profits.
E[π̃fmt(Jfmt; θ̂, γ̂)] ≥ E[π̃fmt(Jfmt ∪ j′; θ̂, γ̂)]− Fj′mt, ∀j′ ∈Jft \ Jfmt (3.19)
9For example, see Eizenberg (2014) and Fan and Yang (2020)
108
where π̃fmt(Jfmt; θ̂, γ̂) represents variable profits, which does not include fixed costs (as in
Equation 3.9 above). Rearranging expression 3.19 can form a lower bound on the per-period
fixed cost of producing j′ in market m,
Fj′mt ≥ E[π̃fmt(Jfmt ∪ j′; θ̂)− π̃fmt(Jfmt; θ̂)] for j′ ∈Jft \ Jfmt (3.20)
Similarly, we can construct upper bounds on a product j′ observed to be supplied in a
given market at a given time by simulating counterfactual variable profits without j′.
E[π̃fmt(Jfmt; θ̂)]− Fj′mt ≥ E[π̃fmt(Jfmt \ j′; θ̂)] for j′ ∈ Jfmt (3.21)
Rearranging gives an upper bound on per-period fixed costs for j′,
Fj′mt ≤ E[π̃fmt(Jfmt; θ̂)− π̃fmt(Jfmt \ j′; θ̂)] for j′ ∈ Jfmt (3.22)
For a given product j′, one side of the set identified fixed cost interval can be estimated
using simulated profits for alternative, unobserved product offering sets to generate empirical
counterparts to the bounds given by the RHS of inequalities 3.20 and 3.22. For a product
in the observed product set, i.e., j′ ∈ Jfmt, an upper bound on per-period fixed costs are
given by the magnitude of change in variable profits for firm f if j′ were to be dropped, and
all else equal. Similarly, for a product not in firm f ’s product set, a lower bound on fixed
cost is given by the magnitude of change in firm f ’s variables profits were that product to
be supplied by f , all else equal.
In practice, to “fill in” the remaining fixed cost bounds, to be conservative, I use the
extremums of fixed costs derived via inequality approach described above. For example, for
a product j′ in the observed product set, its lower bound is achieved by taking the minimum
estimated lower bound for all other products in the market in the given time period.10
10For the results included in this chapter, to ensure product fixed cost lower bounds are less than upper
bounds, I conservatively use one-half the minimum of calculated lower bounds and twice the maximum of
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I estimate costs only for the three primary manufacturers in the sample (Abbott, Mead
Johnson, and Nestle-Gerber), while assumming all other manufacturers are passive in the
product choice stage, and thus do not require fixed cost bounds for counterfactuals that
endogenize firm product choice.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Demand Parameter Estimates
The demand parameter estimates indicate the “best” guess, given observed sales data, of
underlying parameters that govern consumer tastes. Table 3.2 below can be read as, for each
product attribute, for each subpopulation, what are the estimates of the mean and variance
parameters that govern the distribution of tastes, in terms of added (or diminished) utility
for a marginal ounce of infant formula that exhibits a given product attribute.
As the utility of the outside good, breast feeding, is normalized to zero, the interpretation
of the constant term allows for comparison between inside goods – available infant formula
– and breast feeding. For the subpopulation eligible for WIC vouchers, mean taste for inside
infant formula goods is less than zero, with some heterogeneity, suggesting this subpopulation
largelprefers breast feeding relative to infant formula. The distribution of taste for inside
goods within the non-WIC subpopulation is also mean negative, though to a lesser magnitude
(β0,non-WIC = −0.48), and the estimate for σβ0,non-WIC also suggests heterogeneity in this taste
within this subpopulation.
Given the assumption that WIC consumers only consider inside goods eligible for WIC
vouchers in their choice set, and thus do not face product prices, we cannot identify a price
coefficient (mean nor random coefficient) for this subpopulation. We are, however, able to
identify a price coefficient for the non-WIC subpopulation, given this group of consumers do
face variation in prices. We see that the estimated mean for the non-WIC subpopulation price
coefficient is negative (αnon-WIC = −28.21), implying disutility from higher prices; however,
calculated upper bounds. In future work, I hope to employ the finite sample adjustment for these bounds
described in Eizenberg (2014).
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the random coefficient estimate implies no heterogeneity within this subpopulation.
The parameter estimates for the product attribute “powder” can be interpreted as the
relative taste for powder infant formula products relative to liquid concentrate (i.e., the
omitted group). The mean utility parameter estimates suggest that, relative to the non-
WIC subpopulation, the WIC-eligible subpopulation more strongly prefers powder form to
liquid concentrate. Further, the mean utility parameter point estimate (and standard error)
for powder form for the non-WIC subpopulation suggest the mean taste is not statistically
significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. Though, the random coeffi-
cient estimate (σβpowder,non-WIC = 0.02) does suggest slight heterogeneity in this preference for
powder formula within the non-WIC subpopulation
Overall, the model’s demand parameter estimates suggested by the data seems to exhibit
reasonable taste patterns with some heterogeneity in preferences within subpopulations.
3.7 Counterfactuals
After we have recovered demand preference parameter estimates and marginal and fixed cost
supply parameter estimates by taking the structural model to data, we can run counterfactual
simulations to evaluate the welfare implications of infant formula subsidies. Specifically,
using the structural model, I assess consumer and producer responses to a policy in a single
geographical market in which a larger proportion of the population is eligible for WIC infant
formula vouchers and evaluate the resulting effects on welfare measures.
In the first set of counterfactuals, I allow firms to re-optimize only prices and compare
counterfactual welfare measures to those of the factual environment. For a given increase
in the proportion of WIC-eligible households, I determine new prices, which follow firms’
first order pricing condition, as given in Equation 3.11, as an optimal markup over marginal
costs. I then calculate changes in welfare measures, including consumer surplus and producer
profits.
I then allow for the three primary firms, Mead Johnson, the supplier of the WIC eligible
brand in the sample, Abbott, and Nestle-Gerber to optimally adjust their product portfolio
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and associated prices in response to a change in WIC eligibility. I follow the iterative best-
response algorithm developed in Fan and Yang (2020) to determine equilibrium product
choices for each draw of a vector of product fixed costs. For simplicity in this chapter, I set
demand and cost shocks to zero.11
Table 3.3 shows the surplus measures associated with increasing the eligible WIC popu-
lation by either 20% or 40%, relative to the observed factual scenario, under both price-only
supply-side adjustments (top panel) and price and product adjustments (bottom panel) in
the Detroit DMA during the last month of the sample (i.e., December 2015).12 From these
results, we see that, only considering price adjustments, an increase in the proportion of
the population that is eligible for WIC voucher would suggest consumer surplus losses and
producer surplus losses, each increasing in magnitude as the WIC proportion increases.13
However, we see that, if both product and price changes were accounted for, the associ-
ated counterfactuals with increasing WIC populations suggests the firms’ optimal response
is to reduce the number of product offerings (from 28 products to, on average, 27.3 and
26.2, respectively), which drives an additional reduction in consumer surplus. In summary,
a price-only response generates total surplus losses that increase in the counterfactual pro-
portion of WIC-eligible; however, these losses are less in magnitude than if, perhaps more
realistically, firms adjust in both product and price margins, resulting in larger losses in
11As is done in Fan and Yang (2020), demand and cost shocks can be taken over the recovered empirical
distribution of these objects or a fitted distribution (e.g., normal) derived from the respective empirical
distributions. I look to incoporate these steps in future versions of this work.
12The baseline proportion of WIC-eligible households is 17.04%. Increasing the fraction of WIC-eligible
household by 20% results in an increase by 3.41 percentage points to 20.45% (middle column counterfactuals).
Increasing the baseline proportion 40% results in an increase by 6.82 percentage points to 23.86% (last column
counterfactuals).
13In the calculation of consumer surplus, since WIC consumers face a price of zero for their assumed
inside good choice set (i.e., WIC products), and, in the product and price adjustment counterfactuals, WIC
products are not able to be removed, the change in consumer surplus for consumers that are WIC-eligible in
both the factual and counterfactual is zero. Further, I do not include changes in surplus for the population
that is newly eligible for WIC vouchers since I am not able to recover consumer surplus for this subpopulation
since a price parametner (i.e., α̃WIC) is not identified for this subpopulation. Even if we assumed a price
coefficient for this subpopulation (e.g., α̃WIC = α̃non-WIC), the model could suggest negative surplus given
the reduction in choices between the factual and counterfactuals for these consumers stemming from the
assumption WIC consumers only choose between WIC products. As a result, the reported consumer surplus
measures in this chapter can be thought of as welfare for the subpopulation of consumers that are not WIC
eligible in both the factual and relevant counterfactual scenario.
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total surplus, though still increasing in magnitude with the counterfactual proportion of
WIC-eligible consumers.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed a model of demand and supply in the infant formula
industry to understand how demand-side subsidies effect short-run welfare when accounting
for supply-side pricing and product responses. The demand model allows for heterogeneity
of consumer tastes by allowing for subpopulation-specific random coefficient parameters that
govern the distributions on taste for observable product attributes. The supply model allows
for price and product responses by firms to counterfactual policies that increase the eligible
population for WIC infant formula vouchers.
In these counterfactual exercises, I find that consumer, producer, and total surplus dimin-
ish when increasing the WIC-eligible population in Detroit during December 2015. Further,
when incorporating product adjustments, along with price, the magnitude in each welfare
measure increases. This result provides support for the need to incorporate both pricing and
product responses when accurately evaluating policies in differentiated product industries.
As discussed above, the reported consumer surplus measures in this chapter do not in-
coporate surplus from newly-WIC eligible consumers. Therefore, from the social planner’s
perspective, the magnitude of the decreases in total surplus when increasing the WIC pop-
ulation in counterfactual simulations in this paper can be thought of as a lower bound of
required gains in surplus from newly-WIC eligible consumers. For example, when increasing
the number of WIC-eligible consumers by 20% and allowing for firm pricing and product re-
sponses, total surplus decreases by $9,750 (Table 3.3, bottom panel, middle column). Thus,
the social planner would enact this policy only if the resulting increase in consumer surplus
for those newly WIC-eligible was greater than $9,750.
The framework developed in this chapter can further be used to evaluate additional pro-
posed policies in the infant formula industry, as well as more broadly be used to understand
demand-side subsidies in differentiated product markets. For example, in the factual setting,
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only one brand of formula is eligible for purchase by WIC vouchers. A natural extension is
to consider the welfare effects of relaxing this policy to allow for multiple eligible brands,
while incorporating firms’ responses in both the price and product dimensions. I leave this,
and related questions, to future research.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Min Max
Price ($/reconstituted oz.) 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.60
Powder indicator 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00
Liquid concentrate indicator 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
WIC eligible indicator 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Total observations 5,888
Price (for WIC eligible) 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.29
Rebate (for WIC eligible) 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.15
WIC eligible observations 432
Note: Observations at the product-market-month level.
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Table 3.2: Demand Parameter Estimates
Subpopulation Mean Utility Random Coeff.






















Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. Estimates based on GMM estimation on 5,888
product-market-month observations in Michigan from January 2012 – December 2015.
Concentrate characteristic ommitted given all observations in the sample are either concentrate or
powder form. Firm, year, and DMA fixed effects included. The non-WIC population’s mean
utility on price is constrained in estimation procedure to be less than zero. Excluded instruments
are functions of other firms’ products’ characteristics in the same market and same firm’s other
products’ charateristics.
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Table 3.3: Counterfactual Results
Obs. WIC Pop. Increase 1 Increase 2
(ζ ′ = ζ0) (ζ
′ = 1.2ζ0) (ζ
′ = 1.4ζ0)
Price-Only Adjustment
Number Products 28.0 28.0 28.0
∆ Consumer Surplus ($) - -5,573 -11,073
∆ Profits - -3,048 -6,070
∆ Rebate Payments - 581 1,161
∆ Voucher Payments - -380 -781
∆ Total Surplus - -8,420 -16,764
Product and Price Adjustment
Number Products 28.0 27.3 26.2
∆ Consumer Surplus ($) - -6,941 -24,192
∆ Variable Profits - -4,848 -10,952
∆ Fixed Costs - 1,835 5,070
∆ Rebate Payments - 581 1,161
∆ Voucher Payments - -377 -768
∆ Total Surplus - -9,750 -29,681
Note: Counterfactuals evaluated for the Detroit DMA during the last month of the sample
(December 2015) with changes relative to the observed factual scenario (i.e., under ζ0 in
December 2015) in US dollars ($). For product and price adjustment counterfactuals (bottom
panel), for each evaluated increase in WIC eligibility, I draw a product fixed cost vector from the
recovered empirical bounds and evaluate each respective counterfactual. I repeat this process for
25 fixed cost draws and average over welfare measures. Changes in consumer surplus represent
changes in welfare for consumers not eligible for WIC vouchers in both factual and respective
counterfactual scenarios. Changes in fixed costs (bottom panel) expressed in terms of producer
surplus gains due to fixed costs saved. Voucher payments represent total revenues for WIC
eligible products and rebate payments represent payments from the WIC provider to the state.
Both of these transfers are accounted for in variable profit measures, which allows for (changes in)
total surplus to be taken as the sum of each respective sub-column.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Appendix
A.1.1 Additional Comparative Statics
This section provides additional detail to the comparative static exercises using the theoreti-
cal model developed in Section 1.2. As demonstrated in Figure A.1, when adding a vertically
integrated store brand product, retailers and consumers both unambiguously benefit, while
the sign in the change in manufacturer profits varies on model parameters (Figure A.2).
Particularly, vectors of model parameters that generate equilibria where retailers gain more
correspond to larger decreases in manufacturer profits.
When a vertically integrated store brand replaces a national brand product supplied at
arm’s-length, the sign of the change in retailer profits corresponds to the sign of the change
in consumer surplus. For example, as demonstrated in Figure A.3, when the replacement by
a store brand would yield a decrease in retailer profits, consumers would likewise be worse
off. Alternatively, a profitable replacement yields an increase in surplus. On the other hand,
upon the replacement of a national brand product by a retailer’s store brands, manufacturer
profits nearly always decrease (Figure A.4).
A.1.2 Additional Event Studies
I conduct additional event studies that assess retailer responses in the product and price
margins around store brand product line introductions.
Wholesale Prices
I also conduct an additional event study on the wholesale price of national brand product
lines around the time of store brand introductions. To do so, I replace the lefthand side of
the regression specification given in Equation (1.7) with wholesale prices from Promo Data
PriceTrak. Coefficients from this regression are plotted in Figure A.5. Given the coefficient
estimates, there does not seem to be a detectable change in wholesale prices at time of
entry. This negative result could be due to two possibilties. First, theory would predict an
ambiguous effect of store brand introduction on national brand wholesale prices, depending
on the substitutability of introduced store brand with existing national brands. Second,
and perhaps more likely, the data I have on wholesale prices is relatively coarse – from one
distributor in only a select number of geographic markets. So the event study is assessing
the impact of a retailer’s store brand entry on a representative wholesale transaction price,
not necessarily by the “introducing” retailer.
120














-.25 0 .25 .5
∆ Retailer Profits
Note: Each dot represents changes in equilibrium welfare measures for a given vector of model parameters.
The x-axis represents the change in retailer profits when moving from the baseline scenario A1 to the
comparative scenario B. Positive x-values represent an increase in profits for the retailer in moving from
the baseline to comparative scenario. Change in consumer surplus is plotted on the y-axis. Positive
y-values represent increasing total surplus when moving from the baseline to comparative scenario.
Parameter values: α = −5, cj = 0, γ = 0.1, ωj = 0 and
(β, xj , ξj) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 1.5, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}, ∀j = 1, 2, 3. Equilibria associated with duplicative vectors
with variation only in parameters pertaining to product j = 2, which do not impact the comparative static
exercise between Scenarios A1 and B, are removed for visual clarity.
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∆ Retailer Profits
Note: Each dot represents changes in equilibrium welfare measures for a given vector of model parameters.
The x-axis represents the change in retailer profits when moving from the baseline scenario A1 to the
comparative scenario B. Positive x-values represent an increase in profits for the retailer in moving from the
baseline to comparative scenario. Change in manufacturer profits is plotted on the y-axis. Positive y-values
represent increasing total surplus when moving from the baseline to comparative scenario. Parameter
values: α = −5, cj = 0, γ = 0.1, ωj = 0 and (β, xj , ξj) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 1.5, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}, ∀j = 1, 2, 3.
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∆ Retailer Profits
Note: Each dot represents changes in equilibrium welfare measures for a given vector of model parameters.
The x-axis represents the change in retailer profits when moving from the baseline scenario A2 to the
comparative scenario B. Positive x-values represent an increase in profits for the retailer in moving from
the baseline to comparative scenario. Change in consumer surplus is plotted on the y-axis. Positive
y-values represent increasing total surplus when moving from the baseline to comparative scenario.
Parameter values: α = −5, cj = 0, γ = 0.1, ωj = 0 and
(β, xj , ξj) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 1.5, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}, ∀j = 1, 2, 3. Equilibria associated with duplicative vectors
with variation only in parameters pertaining to product j = 2, which do not impact the comparative static
exercise between Scenarios A1 and B, are removed for visual clarity.
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∆ Retailer Profits
Note: Each dot represents changes in equilibrium welfare measures for a given vector of model parameters.
The x-axis represents the change in retailer profits when moving from the baseline scenario A2 to the
comparative scenario B. Positive x-values represent an increase in profits for the retailer in moving from the
baseline to comparative scenario. Change in manufacturer profits is plotted on the y-axis. Positive y-values
represent increasing total surplus when moving from the baseline to comparative scenario. Parameter
values: α = −5, cj = 0, γ = 0.1, ωj = 0 and (β, xj , ξj) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 1.5, 2} × {−2, 0, 2}, ∀j = 1, 2, 3.
Figure A.5: Average Percentage Change in Wholesale Price of National Brand Product



















Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Results
Figure B.1: Theoretical Simulation: The Sum of Diversion Ratios between the Licensor
and the Two Licensees before Merger. This figure shows that the equilibrium sum of
diversion ratios is determined by and increases with respect to the travel parameter ρ.
Here, we can observe the relationship between the bias in predicted changes in equilibrium
objects and model primitives. In Figure B.9, we see that, for a given sum of diversion ratios
between the licensor and each respective licensee, the overstated decrease in consumer surplus
from the licensor-licensee merger is increasing in the royalty rate, r. In terms of producer
surplus, for a given sum of diversion ratios, the overstated increase in producer surplus from
the merger is increasing in the royalty rate, r.
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Figure B.2: Theoretical Simulation: Prediction Bias on Consumer Welfare Effect of the
Merger between the Licensor A and the Licensee B when royalty rate is 80% of the
licensee’s marginal costs. This figure illustrates the non-monotonicity of the prediction bias
with respect to the sum of diversion ratios.
Figure B.3: Theoretical Simulation: Magnitude of the alignment effect divided by the
estimation bias in the licensor’s marginal costs.
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Figure B.4: Theoretical Simulation: Estimation Bias in the Marginal Costs of Licensee B.
Figure B.5: Theoretical Simulation: Estimation Bias in the Marginal Costs of Licensee C.
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Figure B.6: Guidance Simulations: estimation bias in costs between mis-specified and true
models for firm A (licensor) against royalty rate, r
Figure B.7: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted average price
effects of the merger between licensor and licensee.
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Figure B.8: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the total quantity effects of the
merger between licensor and licensee.
Figure B.9: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the consumer surplus effects of the
merger between licensor and licensee.
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Figure B.10: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the producer surplus effects of the
merger between licensor and licensee.
Figure B.11: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the share-weighted average price
effects of the merger between licensees.
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Figure B.12: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the total quantity effects of the
merger between licensees.
Figure B.13: Guidance Simulations: prediction bias in the consumer surplus effects of the
merger between licensees.
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